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INTRODUCTION

It has now been four decades since the Supreme Court stepped
into the political thicket with its groundbreaking series of reappor
tionment cases.1 Those cases rather quickly brought about radical
changes in the structure of our national, state, and local governments
* Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. 1989, M.A. 1991, Univer
sity of Kansas; J.D. 1995, Stanford. - Ed. I am most grateful to Stephen Ellis for our many
conversations on the subject of interpersonal utility comparisons, and to Heather Gerken,
Joanna Grossman, Eric Freedman, Rick Hasen, Sam Issacharoff, Eric Lane, William Rose,
and Peter Spiro for their helpful suggestions. Thanks as well to Katherine Gavett, Kristy
DeAngelo, and Sarika Kapoor for their valuable research assistance.

1. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 5 33 (1964).
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and, in so doing, reshaped the political landscape of the country in
many, mostly beneficial, ways. The reapportionment cases also sig
naled the beginning of a revolution in the way we view the rights asso
ciated with meaningful participation in a democratic society, a revolu
tion that continues to this day. We now enjoy a right to vote that is
much more comprehensive - both in terms of who has the right to
exercise the franchise and what that right entails - than at any other
time in our history.
Despite this record of success, one of the most important and least
controversial aspects of the right to vote - the one person, one vote
principle - has never been adequately theorized. Academics, politi
cians, and the general public have, instead, taken it as an article of
democratic faith. We are utterly confident that the one person, one
vote principle rests on firm democratic foundations, that it is, in some
sense, objective, and that it is a judicially manageable way of parsing
out political power. The thesis of this Article is that this confidence is
wholly misplaced.
The right to vote now embodies three conceptually distinct types
of rights.2 First, it includes the right to cast a vote.3 This right of access
to the polls is, quite obviously, a necessary component of any concep
tion of the right to vote, and represents the right at its most fundamen
tal level. But the ability to register and vote, taken alone, does not
secure meaningful political participation because district lines may be
drawn in ways that effectively dilute the power of that vote. Such vote
dilution comes in two forms, quantitative and qualitative, and the
rights associated with casting an undiluted vote are the second and
third types of voting rights.4 Quantitative vote dilution occurs when
votes receive unequal weight, and thus the power of some votes is nu-

2. I borrow this basic taxonomy from Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The
Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 17 3, 176 (1989). This, of course, is not the only way to categorize the many facets of
political participation and the right to vote. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY 7-9 (1994) (categorizing the three generations of attempts to curb tyrannical
majorities as involving (1) access to the ballot, (2) qualitative vote dilution, and (3) the po

licing of legislative voting rules). Karlan's taxonomy does, however, capture most of the es
sential elements of the right, and follows the basic structure of the law.
3. Claims asserting infringement on the right to cast a vote are typically brought under
the Constitution. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding
that a poll tax prerequisite to voting in a state election violated the Equal Protection
Clause). The Republican Form of Government Clause in the original Constitution implicitly
protects the right to vote, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1, while constitutional amendments
provide more explicit protections to vote free from discrimination on the basis of race, U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1; on the basis of sex, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1; by reason of poll
taxes in federal elections, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; or on account of age for citizens
who are eighteen years of age or older, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
4. For a short summary of these two types of vote dilution rights, see Grant M. Hayden,
The Limits of Social Choice Theory: A Defense of the Voting Rights Act, 74 TUL. L. REV. 87,
91-98 (1999).
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merically diluted.5 Qualitative dilution, on the other hand, occurs
when a voter has less opportunity to elect a representative of her
choice, most often as a result of gerrymandered district lines, despite
the fact that her vote is weighted equally with all other votes cast.6
Of these three types of rights, the right to a quantitatively undi
luted vote is the least controversial. A vote is numerically diluted
whenever districts are drawn in ways that deviate from a standard dis
trict size. Take, for example, a three-member governing body repre
senting three single-member districts in a county of 30,000 people. If
district lines are drawn such that the first district has a population of
5,000, the second 5,000, and the third 20,000, then voters in the third
district have an obvious disadvantage in voting power as a result of the
unequal district sizes. The norm used to measure the extent of their
dilution is the equiproportional standard, captured by the appealing
phrase "one person, one vote."
The one person, one vote principle was at the heart of the early re
apportionment cases and has since become the sine qua non of democ
racy.7 One of the primary reasons for its success is that it appears to be
an objective or neutral way of parsing out political power. That is, un
like the other two types of voting rights - which involve the norma
tively loaded issues of who receives the right to vote and which groups
deserve the right to a qualitatively undiluted vote - the quantitative
cases can be resolved by mere reference to what is viewed as an ele
mental component of democracy. For that reason, the one person, one
vote standard enjoys tremendous popular support, and legal chal
lenges to districts that deviate from it are both temporally and doctri
nally privileged.
The main thrust of this Article is that this accepted way of viewing
quantitative vote dilution is misguided. A close examination of recent
work in analytic philosophy and social economics makes clear that a
decision to apply the one person, one vote standard is no more neutral
or objective than decisions made with respect to the other two types of
voting rights. In addition, removing the aura of objectivity from the
standard helps reveal the connection between the three different types
of voting rights that we now recognize. This, in tum, may allow us to
restructure the law in a way that reflects the fundamental nature of the
underlying rights.
5. Claims asserting quantitative vote dilution are actionable under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
6. Claims asserting qualitative vote dilution, while once litigated primarily under the
Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), are now typically
pursued under the more relaxed standards of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Amend
ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2000) ). See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
7. For a survey of both academic and societal support for the standard, see infra notes
52-65 and accompanying text.
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I will develop my argument in three stages. Part I of the Article in
volves an account of some of the basic concepts involved in quantita
tive vote dilution. It begins with a brief historical survey of the legal
status of population and voting, followed by a discussion of the con
temporary appeal of the one person, one vote standard. I conclude this
Part with a review of some of the arguments advanced for and against
the standard, concluding that most arguments neither justify nor un
dermine the standard, and certainly do little to link it to the other
types of voting rights.
Part II explores what I think is the key to understanding the claim
of neutrality for the one person, one vote standard: the enduring
problem of making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Utility, for
our purposes, is best defined in terms of preference satisfaction, and
thus in order to figure out the social utility of a particular state of af
fairs, we must be able to compare (and, ultimately, sum up) each indi
vidual's level of satisfaction. If, for example, I have a box of cookies
and a box of crackers to distribute to my two children at the start of a
long drive, I would want to know the relative strength of each child's
preferences with respect to those treats in order to choose the distribu
tion of cookies and crackers with the largest aggregate utility (or low
est decibel level).
Other, seemingly more important policy and distribution issues
also require this sort of assessment of people's preferences. Such an
assessment is also built into our acceptance of the one person, one
vote standard, which, after all, instructs us how to weigh voter prefer
ences in our political system. Thus, in this second Part, I will work
through various attempts made by positivist philosophers and econo
mists to compare the strength of individual preferences. As it turns out
(much to the chagrin of those theorists), comparing the strength of the
preferences of two or more people can never be done in a value-free,
"objective" way.
Finally, Part III argues that the value-laden process of making in
terpersonal utility comparisons means that attempts to weight votes which, after all, are revealed preferences - are similarly tainted. That
is, any quantitative vote dilution standard, including one person, one
vote, necessarily involves normative judgments. This results in the
somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that the avoidance, not accep
tance, of interpersonal utility comparisons may be what drives us to
the equiproportional standard. When faced with the difficulties in as
sessing the strength of voter preferences with respect to most matters,
we, in effect, have thrown up our hands and opted to assign them all
equal weights. I also explain how the concept of interpersonal utility
comparisons informs our view of deviations from the standard, and
how it ties the three aspects of voting rights into a more unified whole.
I conclude this Part, and the Article, with some preliminary sugges
tions for changes in voting rights law.
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QUANTITATIVE VOTE DILUTION AND ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE

A.

The Legal Status of Population and Voting

Like the history of the franchise generally,8 the relationship be
tween population and voting did not involve smooth and inexorable
progress toward a particular goal (with the franchise, universal suf
frage; with populations and voting, equally weighted voting). Nor did
it involve a sudden moment of enlightenment in which the Court
swept aside centuries of dimwitted political thinking and constitution
alized the equiproportional standard. Instead, the notion that people
exercising equally weighted votes should elect representative bodies
had been central to our notion of government from the country's in
ception.9 Then, over the first half of the twentieth century, the com
mon practice of placing voters in equally sized districts fell by the way
side as a result of restrictive state-constitution provisions and state
legislators' unwillingness to relinquish power in the face of substantial
demographic change.10 The constitutionally groundbreaking reappor
tionment cases of the 1 960s, Baker v. Carr,11 Reynolds v. Sims,12 and
Wesberry v. Sanders,13 were less a revolution than a rebirth - albeit
one with a vengeance - of a practice long part of American political
institutions.

8. For a recent discussion of the expansions and contractions of the right to vote, and
their social, economic, and political causes, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000). See also
MARCHETTE G. CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN
AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL, MINORITY REPRESENTATION
AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE
PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS
IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM
PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman
eds., 1994).
9. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTA
TION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 16-22 (1966) [hereinafter BAKER,
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION] ; ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW
AND POLmcs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 16-29 (1965); Gordon E. Baker, One Person,
One Vote: "Fair and Effective Representation"?, in REPRESENTATION AND MISRE
PRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 71, 7274 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968) [hereinafter Baker, One Person, One Vote]; see also
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1964) (discussing the historical foundation of the
standard).
10. See BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 24-31; MCKAY,
supra note 9, at 49-52.
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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While the Declaration of Independence proclaimed it "self
evident" that "all Men are created equal,"14 there was no language to
that effect in the original Constitution. Nonetheless, there are many
signs that proportional representation, if not the norm, was at least a
benchmark for democracy at the national level in the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. For example, there is evidence that the
Framers intended members of the House of Representatives - the
only popularly elected federal office at the time15 - to be elected by
people with equally weighted votes.16 The sentiment could also be
found in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which, when providing for
future governments of the Northwest Territory, said that its inhabi
tants "shall always be entitled to the benefits . . . of a proportionate
representation of the people in the legislature. "17 Thus, there is some
indication that population-based districting was an accepted practice
on the federal level at the time the country was founded.
The situation was similar at the state level.18 Six of the original thir
teen states based representation in both houses of their state legisla
tures on population.19 And equality in representation made great gains
during the period in which states were adopting their first constitu
tions. 20 Indeed, of the remaining thirty-seven states, all but seven
originally provided for population-based representation in both
14. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
15. The president is chosen by members of the Electoral College, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 3, and, under the original Constitution, senators were chosen by the state legislatures,
U.S. CONST. art I,§ 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913,
provides for the direct election of senators. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
16. See ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION 6-14 (rev. ed. 1964). The evidence comes from a wide range of sources,
including the Constitution, the Philadelphia Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the state
ratifying conventions. Id.; see also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-18 (explaining that the historical
context of the constitutional requirement that representatives be chosen "by the People of
the several States" demands use of the equiproportional standard). But see id. at 30-39
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the historical record does not support the constitution
alization of the equiproportional standard).
17. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-west
of the river Ohio, art. II (1787), 1 Stat. 50-2 (1789); see Baker, One Person, One Vote, supra
note 9, at 72.
18. For an extensive discussion of the law governing apportionment and redistricting in
each of the fifty states, see McKAY, supra note 9, at app.
19. See BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 20; Baker, One
Person, One Vote, supra note 9, at 72-73; see also MCKAY, supra note 9, at 17-19. But see
ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW
AND POLITICS 60-64 (1968) [hereinafter DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION] ; Robert
G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle
for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209, 239-42 (1964). These contrasting views stem
from conflicting interpretations of what it meant for a state constitution to call for appor
tionments based predominantly on population. For a discussion of the issue, see Baker, One
Person, One Vote, supra note 9, at 73.
20. See McKAY, supra note 9, at 16-19.
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houses.21 Thus, whatever one says about the rise of the concept of
population-based apportionment in the 1960s and 1970s, it was only
new to those with short historical memories.
The beginning of the shift away from population-based appor
tionment came in the five-year period after the Civil War.22 Many of
the southern states reentered the Union with new constitutions that
incorporated factors other than population into their districting
schemes.23 The South Carolina Senate, for example, included one
senator from each county, regardless of population.24 The real shift,
though, occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, as new pat
terns of migration and immigration transformed the demographic
landscape of America.
The waves of Europeans and rural blacks who migrated to urban
areas meant that, by 1 920, white, Protestant, rural Americans had be
come a minority.25 They were, nevertheless, a minority with control
over state legislatures and, hence, command over the reapportionment
process for congressional and state legislative districts. In the face of
the dramatic population shifts from the country to the city, the rural
minority did what it could to preserve its own power, which, in short,
meant that it did absolutely nothing - it refused to redraw district
lines in light of the population changes.26
The effect of the refusal to redistrict was to numerically concen
trate the voting power of those in the relatively small (and shrinking)
rural districts, and, correspondingly, to dilute the power of those in the
large (and growing) urban districts. Over time, the disparities grew
quite large. In Vermont, for example, the most populous district had
987 times more people than the least populous (and, of course, both
districts sent one representative to the state legislature ).27 While
Vermont was an outlier, population differentials of ten or twenty to
one were quite common by the middle of the century.28
21. See id. at 24-25. From 1790 to 1889, no state was admitted with an original constitu
tion that did not provide for representation based principally on population. Id.
22. See William J.D. Boyd, Reapportionment: Problems, Prospects, and Probabilities, in
REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION, supra note 9, at 115, 115.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See C.

Herman Pritchett, Representation and the Rule
REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION, supra note 9, at 1, 3.

of

Equality,

in

26. As H.L. Mencken put it, "The yokels hang on because old apportionments give
them unfair advantages." J. Anthony Lukas, Barnyard Government in Maryland, in
REAPPORTIONMENT 55 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1964); see also BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 24-31; MCKAY, supra note 9, at 49-53.
27. See PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN &
SUBURBAN VOTE 3 (1961).
28. The districts at issue in Baker v. Carr, for example, gave rise to differences in voting
power of twenty to one, see 369 U.S. 186, 245 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring), and those in
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A political solution to this numerical bottleneck was not forth
coming. State legislators from the more sparsely populated rural dis
tricts had no interest in redistricting themselves out of office (or out of
power). And, for many years, the Supreme Court was disinclined to
intervene in what it considered to be a nonjusticiable political ques
tion. But while Colegrove v. Green, the landmark case on that issue,
upheld the judiciary's hands-off approach,29 it also signaled the
changes to come, for three members of the Court asserted for the first
time that the Equal Protection Clause required the election of repre
sentatives from districts of roughly equal size.30
The reapportionment cases of the early 1960s, of course, broke
through the political logjam. The Court found in Baker v. Carr that
the unequal districts resulting from the Tennessee legislature's refusal
to reapportion in the face of large population shifts gave rise to a justi
ciable claim under the Equal Protection Clause.31 And while the Court
saw no immediate need to devise standards for judging numerical dilu
tion claims (for the merits of the case were not before it),32 it soon
provided some guidance. The very next year, the Court articulated the
basic standard in Gray v. Sanders: "The conception of political equal
ity from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
can mean only one thing - one person, one vote."33
While "one person, one vote" established an ideal - that of equi
proportional voting power - the phrase did not demarcate the range
of constitutionally permissible variation. The Court offered some re
finements on the basic standard the following year in Wesberry v.
Sanders34 and Reynolds v. Sims.35 In Wesberry, the Court held that "the
command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People
of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's

Reynolds v. Sims up to forty-one to one, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964). See also BAKER,
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 82 tbl.11 (listing the range of variation
for congressional districts in selected states); MCKAY, supra note 9, at 46-47 (listing the

range of variation for state legislative districts).
29. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
30. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 569-72 (Black, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Murphy
joined Justice Black's dissent both on the equal protection issue and in finding apportion
ment issues to be justiciable. Id. at 572-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
31. 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
32. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198. The lack of a standard stemmed from the political com
promises necessary to achieve a majority on the justiciability issue. See RICHARD L. HASEN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO
BUSH V. GORE 52 (2003).

33. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
34. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
35. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."36
And the Reynolds Court found that "seats in both houses of a bicam
eral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis,"37 by
which it meant that one's right to vote is unconstitutionally impaired
when the weight of that vote "is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State."38
Thus, when it came to this "basic standard of equality among voters"39
for congressional and state legislative elections, after Wesberry and
Reynolds we had some language indicating the range of permissible
variation, at a minimum giving us the idea that the Court may permit
some deviation from the ideal.
Over the next several decades, faced with districting plans lacking
the dramatic population differences in earlier cases, the Court was
forced to further refine its standard.40 It increasingly held congres
sional districts to a strict standard that did not permit them any devia
tion from the ideal size.41 The Court, however, effectively gave state
36. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8 (emphasis added). While the Court later conceded that "it
may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision," id. at 18,
that possibility became real with the advent of better census data and more powerful com
puters, see Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1993).
37. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 561.
40. Refinements of the standard included developing a standard method of calculating
deviation from the equiproportional ideal. The Supreme Court developed a measure called
the maximum population deviation, which is calculated for single-member districts using the
following steps: First, calculate the ideal district size by dividing the apportionment base
(usually population) by the number of districts. Then, add the percentage excess of the larg
est district over the ideal district size to the percentage deficit of the smallest district under
the ideal district size. That sum is the maximum population deviation. This method is most
clearly shown in Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1975).
If, for example, we are dividing a population of 30,000 among three legislative districts,
our ideal district size is 10,000. If the largest and smallest districts actually have populations
of 11,500 and 8,000, the maximum population deviation is 35% (15% deviation upward plus
20% deviation downward).
41. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983) (rejecting a New Jersey dis
tricting plan that involved a .6984% maximum deviation); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526, 528-30 (1969) (rejecting a Missouri districting plan that involved a 5.97% maximum de
viation). While the Court has been clear that it allows slight deviations in certain circum
stances, see Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740; Connor v.
Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1977); Chapman, 420 U.S. at 26, it rarely finds that such circum
stances exist.
The constitutional requirement that representatives be apportioned among the several
states means that congressional districts do not cross state lines, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3, from which it follows that the Court's standard of "precise mathematical equality,"
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31, only applies to districts within a single state. After the most
recent round of redistricting, this, coupled with the one-representative-per-state minimum,
means that while the congressional district in Wyoming has a population of 495,304, the one
in Montana has a population of 905,316. See KAREN M. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 1, 4 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/c2kbr01-7.pdf. The average district size is 646,952. Id. at 1.
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and local election districts a more flexible standard, allowing maxi
mum deviations of up to 10% without justification42 and slightly
greater deviations when suitably justified.43 But even these deviations
were quite small compared to those in the decades before Baker,
Reynolds, and Wesberry. Thus, the one person, one vote standard now
reigns supreme over congressional, state, and local legislative district
ing schemes,44 and enjoys the doctrinal privilege of being one of the
few Equal Protection Clause violations actionable without a showing
of discriminatory intent.45
B.

The Popular Appeal of "One Person, One Vote"

In marked contrast to its reluctance to accept some of the Warren
Court's other forays into civil rights, America has embraced the one
person, one vote standard.46 The reasons for the standard's popular
appeal are not mysterious. It stems in part from the standard's ability
to capture an egalitarian sentiment in something approaching an
aphorism.47 At the same time, it appears to reflect America's individu-

42. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983):
" [M]inor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insuffi
cient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to require justification by the State." [The Court's] decisions have estab
lished, as a general matter, that an apport ionment plan with a maximum population devia
tion under 10% falls within the category of minor deviations.

Id. (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973)); see also Connor, 431 U.S. at
418; White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 751.
43. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (upholding a Virginia state redistricting
plan with a maximum deviation of 16.4% on the basis of the state's interest in preserving the
integrity of political subdivision boundary lines), modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
44. There are some limited exemptions that apply to some governing bodies. See, e.g.,
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 733-35 (1973) (al
lowing elections for the governing body of a water-storage district to weight votes according
to the assessed valuation of each voter's land). For a fuller discussion of the exemption for
"special-purpose districts," see infra text accompanying notes 185-203.

45. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1414-15 (7th
Cir. 1992).
46. See Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1657 n.72 (stating that "the appeal of individual
equality in the political process proved so strong that these decisions did not spark an outcry
similar to that arising in response to the Court's forays into the civil rights and criminal jus
tice areas"); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census,
50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 741 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, The Fire Next Time] (claiming that,
unlike some of the Warren Court's other holdings, "one person, one vote has occasioned no
backlash and seems wildly popular across the political spectrum"); Robert B. McKay, Reap
portionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 M ICH. L. REV. 223, 224-25 (1968) (noting
that the decisions were more easily implemented than those involving race relations, the
First Amendment, and criminal justice).
47. See Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One
Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 207 (E.
Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) ("Ask the average person on the street
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alist ethic and its people's affection for the rights of everyday citizens.
Finally, like a well-engineered slogan, it structures the issue of repre
sentation in a way that makes opposition seem absurd: who could be
against "one person, one vote"?
This is not to say that the Supreme Court's early opinions in the
area were met with universal acclaim. Those in state legislatures, at
least initially, did not share the public's fondness for the standard.
There were serious attempts to amend the Constitution and to restrict
federal-court review of state reapportionment in a way that would re
duce or eliminate the impact of the Supreme Court's reapportionment
decisions.48 But even state legislatures soon began to accept the new
standard,49 perhaps because application of the standard ushered in a
new set of incumbents whose positions now depended, in part, on the
maintenance of the newly drawn districts.50 By the early 1970s, as the
Court was stepping into the morass of qualitative vote dilution, Justice
Brennan could take note of the "truly extraordinary record of compli
ance with the constitutional mandate" of one person, one vote.51
Moreover, many in the academy now take the standard for granted
as a starting point in their analysis of what they view as the more com
plex issue of qualitative vote dilution.52 Those who are most critical of
the Supreme Court's ventures into qualitative vote dilution often con
trast the objective, easily managed one person, one vote standard with
the subjective, normative process that infects judicial decisions in the
qualitative cases.53 For them, the equiproportional standard is the way
what democracy means and she is likely to reply 'majority rule.' Ask her what political
equality means and she is likely to reply 'one person, one vote.' "). The phrase is, in a sense,
the pithy, democratic answer to "might makes right."
48. See BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 12-13 (listing some
of the political repercussions of the 1964 reapportionment decisions); Jerry B. Waters, Re
apportionment: The Legislative Struggle, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION,
supra note 9, at 141, 153-59 (detailing the response of both Congress and outside organiza
tions to Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), from 1964 to 1966). The Republican Party
actually endorsed the idea of a constitutional amendment on apportionment at its 1964 con
vention. Waters, supra, at 154.
49. See Guinier & Karlan, supra note 47, at 211 (noting that while in the early 1960s
forty-eight of the fifty states had legislatures with district variances of more than 15%, by the
early 1970s only fourteen states had such large variances).
50. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980).
51. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 779 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative
Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 379-82 (2001). Early on, of course, it was a different
story, as Baker generated quite a bit of opposition in the academy. See id. at 269 & 369-72
nn.56-62 (listing articles by Alexander Bickel, Stanley Friedelbaum, Jerold Israel, Jo Desha
Lucas, Robert McCloskey, Phil Neal, and Allan Sindler opposing the decision). It was not,
however, without its early defenders. See id. at 368-69 n.52 (listing articles by Thomas
Emerson, Charles Black, Robert McKay, Louis Pollak, and others defending the decision).
53. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why I Don't Under
stand the Concept of Vote Dilution), 50 VAND. L. REV. 327, 331-35 (1997) (contrasting the
"procedural" conception of democracy that relies upon such principles as majority rule and
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that courts have been able to avoid the real political thicket, which
lies, it turns out, in the qualitative cases.s4 And while there have been
some academic criticisms of the one person, one vote standard itself,
most deal, at best, glancing blows.ss Some, for example, focus on the
hopelessness of striving for perfect adherence to the standard in a
world of imperfect demographic information;s6 others concentrate on
the standard's role in providing vehicle lawsuits for virtually any chal
lenge to a new districting plan.s7 Few challenge the equiproportional
standard head on, except to say that there do not appear to be any
positive substantive arguments in its favor.s8 Far more common, how
ever, are unreflective acceptances of the standard, as when one com
mentator, in a tribute to Justice Douglas, wrote that in the one person,
one vote formulation, "one senses the rightness of that decision, as
well as the common sense of this and the other apportionment deci
sions - despite their alleged lack of analysis and fidelity to text."s9
The popular appeal of the one person, one vote standard has, if
anything, increased over the four decades since it became a constitu
tional mandate. It continues to hold a position as the defining charac
teristic of our democracy.60 Popular periodicals, for example, refer to
the standard in glowing terms.61 In the 2000 presidential election con
troversy, the importance of the principles of Reynolds v. Sims was one
of the few things that both parties, and the Supreme Court, could
agree upon.62 It has become so deeply entrenched in the popular
one person, one vote with the "substantive" conception of democracy more closely allied
with qualitative vote dilution claims).
54. See id. at 331.
55. For a more complete discussion, see infra Part I.C.2.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 101-114.
57. See, e.g., Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 735.
58. Some criticize the standard for its failure to achieve the goal of ensuring democratic
fairness. See infra text accompanying notes 115-119. Others just see a lack of substantive ar
guments in its favor. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 87 (1990) (criti
cizing the redistricting decisions on the basis that the "Warren majority's new constitutional
doctrine was supported by nothing"); ELY, supra note 50, at 121 (famously noting that while
the one person, one vote standard "is certainly administratable[,] the more troublesome
question is what else it has to recommend it").
59. Melvin I. Urofsky, William 0. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133,
154 (1992).
60. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Re
districting Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1355 n.7 (2002) (listing
various modem paeans to the standard); Guinier & Karlan, supra note 47, at 207 (discussing
generally the widespread acceptance of the standard).
'

61. See, e.g., John Carey, Is There Any Help for the "Hanging Chad"?, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 27, 2000, at 54 ("One person, one vote. Each vote counts. That's the bedrock of
democracy.").
62. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) ("It must be remembered that 'the right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.' " (quoting Reynolds v.
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imagination that merely questioning the standard can bring about
public approbation. In the contentious confirmation battle over Judge
Charles Pickering, Sr. to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, opponents
condemned him for (among other things) merely being "troubled" by
the legal principle of one person, one vote.63 Michael McConnell, an
academic nominated and confirmed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, ran into similar controversy.64 Indeed, the standard is so
widely accepted that Jon Elster recently defined democracy as "simple
majority rule, based on the principle, 'One person one vote.' "65
C.

Justifications for the One Person, One Vote Standard

1.

Some Traditional Justifications for the Standard

Although the equiproportional standard enjoys an exalted legal
status and continuing popular appeal, the justifications for it are not
altogether obvious. Historically, of course, the explanation for the
move to the standard was that an entrenched political establishment,
determined to hold onto its power in the face of demographic change,
produced legislative districts of radically different sizes. This political
logjam resulted in what Robert McKay called discrimination by both
design and oversight.66 Either way, the judiciary (and others) recog
nized that people in more populous, usually urban, districts were un
derrepresented. Accordingly, such districts received less state and fed
eral attention to their unique problems.67 The introduction of the

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964)); Brief for Petitioners at 40-41, Bush (No. 00-949) ("'The
conception of political equality ... can mean only one thing - one person, one vote . .. .' '[t]he idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot
in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.'" (quoting
Reynolds, 377 U.S.at 558 (internal citations omitted))); Brief of Respondent at 2, Bush (No.
00-949) ("[T]his Court has long championed the fundamental right of all who are qualified to
cast their votes 'and to have votes counted.'" (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554)). The
tenuous connection between the issues in that case and the principles enunciated in
Reynolds makes my point here even more solid.
63. An Unworthy Judicial Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 4, at 12. Judge
Pickering, in an extended discussion of the Supreme Court's quantitative vote dilution cases,
had criticized the Court's application of the one person, one vote standard as being overly
precise.See Fairly v. Forrest County, 814 F. Supp. 1327 ( S.D. Miss. 1993).

64. Judging Michael McConnell, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, § 4, at 12. This charge was
made because McConnell merely questioned the choice to base the one person, one vote
decisions on the Equal Protection Clause as opposed to the guarantee of a republican form
of government. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB .POL'Y 103 (2000).
65. Jon Elster, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Jon Elster &
Rune Slagstad eds., 1998).
66. See MCKAY, supra note 9, at 55-58.
67. See id. at 56-57 (describing instances where state legislatures in Illinois, New York,
and Tennessee acted in ways that disadvantaged those in the states' more populous areas);
see also BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 48-51 (describing ex-
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equiproportional standard, so the story goes, broke the logjam and re
stored principles of majority rule to our political institutions.68
But there was nothing in the malapportionment problem that re
quired such an exacting solution. The differences in voting power in
Baker and Reynolds were, respectively, on the order of twenty and
forty-one to one.69 The Court could have dealt with such large differ
ences without a precise standard by merely issuing a general pro
nouncement that it would not tolerate such large deviations.70 Devia
tions on the order of two or three to one might have met with the
Court's approval when some other substantial state interest was at
stake. The malapportionment of the mid-twentieth century is one of
those instances in which a court should have been able to remedy an
egregious wrong without having to come up with a standard for what,
exactly, is right.71 As Abner Mikva put it, "sometimes the Court
wielding a sledgehammer helps, while a judge applying a scalpel does
only harm. "72
A second justification for the equiproportional standard is that it is
"obj ective."73 It is argued to be an objective standard in at least two
senses. First, it is objective in that it keeps judges from injecting their
amples of state inaction on urban problems); HACKER, supra note 16, at 95-99 (discussing
the impact of malapportioned seats on congressional decisions).
68. See Guinier & Karlan, supra note 47, at 211. There are several good discussions of
the success of the reapportionment cases in this regard. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Conse
quences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 90-94 (1984) (reviewing studies about the impact of state reapportionment on ex
penditures in suburban and urban areas, minority representation, and party strength);
Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political Com
petition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2002) (examining the effect of the reap
portionment decisions on various aspects of representation).
As Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes argue, the potential for political lockup is an
important justification for judicial intervention in democratic politics. See Samuel Issacharoff
& Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50
STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998).
69. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 545 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 245
(1962) ( Douglas, J., concurring).
70. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer points out that the early reapportionment cases provided (cor
rectly, in his view) just such a standard; only later did the Court become more inflexible. See
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 60; see also Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of "Judicially Un
manageable" Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1469 (2002) (arguing for "unmanageable" standards that would provide state and local
governments with more flexibility in redistricting).
71. See Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 227, 227-29 (1985).
72. Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of
Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 697 (1995).
73. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1648 (noting that the Supreme Court in the
1960s considered the one person, one vote standard to be an objective, easily managed basis
for political equality); Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 741 (describing the one
person, one vote standard as the "paradigmatic 'objective ' rule" that "seem[s] to avoid the
invocation of a contestable political philosophy").
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own subjective political views into the redistricting process.74 The
Supreme Court's initial reluctance to venture into the malapportion
ment cases was driven by the concern that courts would be put in the
position of making substantive political judgments, entangling the ju
diciary in the political thicket.75 This trepidation manifested itself in
the search for an "easily managed"76 standard. The Court viewed one
person, one vote as j ust such a neutral, readily administrable basis for
political equality,77 one that would not turn on a judge's political be
lief, but instead upon the application of what Justice Stewart (deri
sively) called "sixth-grade arithmetic."78 Thus, the argument continues,
the standard is objective in that it prevents the judiciary from imposing
its own subjective political beliefs in redistricting cases.
This aspect of the standard's objectivity does not, unfortunately,
carry us very far. It is limited in the sense that once courts restrict the
range of possible redistricting plans to those that fall within an accept
able range of deviation from the standard (even if that range is essen
tially zero, .as it is with congressional districts), there are still many
plans from which to choose. There are countless ways to slice the elec
toral pie into equally sized pieces, and, as the Court has learned over
the last forty years, deciding which way to divvy up the voters involves
making substantive political judgments. To the extent the standard
keeps judges from imposing their own political beliefs on the initial
decision of acceptable district size, it fulfills this purpose no better
than allowing any other decisionmaking mechanism outside the judici
ary's hands - even pure chance - to determine it. Judges could have
litigants draw straws, run a series of coin flips, or rely on random
number generators to decide appropriate district sizes.79 Each of these
is, in this sense, perfectly objective and judicially manageable -

74. This roughly corresponds to what Brian Leiter calls epistemic objectivity. See Brian
Leiter, Introduction to OBJECTIVITY IN LAw AND MORALS 1, 1, 3 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001 ).
The introduction to that volume, as well as the essays therein, provides an excellent discus
sion of the concept of objectivity.
75. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
76. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 620 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
courts are incompetent to make such decisions); Hasen, supra note 70, at 1475-80 (detailing
the judicial search for manageable standards in early reapportionment decisions).
77. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983) (arguing that strict application of
the equiproportional standard was required in order to make it justiciable); Baker, One Per
son, One Vote, supra note 9, at 80-81 (arguing that the one person, one vote standard is more
"durably neutral" than the alternatives); Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1647, 1687.
78. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 510 (1968) ( Stewart, J., dissenting) (main
taining that apportionment is "far too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a
matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic").
79. Samuel Issacharoff recently made a similar point with respect to eliminating legisla
tive self-interest in political gerrymandering. He proposes eliminating redistricting by in
cumbent powers. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (2002).
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judges would be given no chance to inject their own beliefs into a dis
tricting decision.
But the absurdity of proposals that would produce such arbitrary
results tells us that there must be something else to the objective na
ture of the one person, one vote standard. Those who view the stan
dard as objective must not merely mean that it excludes subjective
considerations (in this case, the political views of the judiciary), but
that it relates to some real object, something external to the j udge's
mind.80 And here, the external item, the thing that puts the object in
objective, appears to be our shared ideas about democracy.
Thus, it is argued, the equiproportional standard is somehow nec
essary to the concept of democracy. Initially, because denial of an
equally weighted vote can be redescribed, at some level, as the denial
of the right to vote at all, the standard appears intrinsically linked to
the very idea of casting a vote. This is what the Court was describing in
Reynolds v. Sims when it said that "the right of suffrage can be denied
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as ef
fectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. "81
The difference between being disallowed to cast a vote and allowed to
cast a vote that only carries a thousandth of the weight of other votes
is, at best, a theoretical one, and may not even be that.82 But as
Nate Persily and others recently pointed out, this aspect of quantita
tive vote dilution is best redescribed in the less romantic terms of giv
ing each citizen "the equal probability of casting a tie-breaking vote
regardless of the location of his or her residence, all other things being
equal."83 And, they continue, all things are rarely equal, and the pres
ence of uncompetitive districts and political and racial gerrymanders
renders the one person, one vote standard relatively impotent in this
regard.84
Moreover, the equiproportional standard was viewed as essential
to preserving majoritarian elements of our democracy.85 When there
are deviations in district sizes, representatives elected by a minority of
voters may constitute a majority in the governing body - in general,
80. This corresponds to what Brian Leiter calls metaphysical objectivity. See Leiter, su
pra note 74, at 1-3.
81. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). As discussed below, I agree with this assessment, though
for what I think are different reasons.See infra text accompanying notes 204-230.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 204-230.
83. Persily et al., supra note 68, at 1311.
84. Id. at 1313-14. This also explains, in part, the general failure of the reapportionment
decisions to guarantee political equality, whatever that means. See infra text accompanying
notes 101-119.
85. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflec
tions on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1146-48 (2002)
(discussing this as one of the "core concepts of democratic theory" reflected in the reappor
tionment decisions).
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the larger the deviations, the smaller the controlling minority.s6 In
deed, many of the Court's early decisions and much of the academic
commentary in the area focused on the question of minority control,
and quantified the magnitude of the malapportionment problem by
pointing to the size of a possible controlling minority, not the devia
tions in district size.s7
This, of course, is a legitimate concern, but only to the extent that
we embrace a strict commitment to majority rule. And it is clear from
the structure of some of our most important political institutions the Senate and the Presidency, for example - that we are not so
committed. Nor has the Supreme Court ever stated that strict adher
ence to majoritarian principles is what drove its later one person, one
vote decisions with respect to other institutions. While the early
malapportionment cases involved districts that gave rise to the possi
bility that relatively small minorities would control the statehouse,
those, as discussed above, could be eliminated by a requirement that
districts be of roughly equal sizes. The Court, therefore, has not been
particularly clear in spelling out the theoretical reasons driving such
strict adherence to the equiproportional principle.
Given the Court's relative silence on the theoretical or constitu
tional justification for the one person, one vote rule, most commenta
tors have been left to cobble together fragments of language here and
there in the opinions in an attempt to divine the Court's reasoning.ss
86. Take, for example, a hypothetical state with 100,000 people divided into ten districts.
If six of the districts have 8000 people each, and the other four have 13,000, the total devia
tion from the ideal district size is 50%, and 48% of the state ' s population can, theoretically,
elect a controlling majority in the statehouse. If, on the other hand, the six smaller districts
have 6000 people each, and the other four districts have 16,0 00, the total deviation from the
ideal district size is 100%, and 36% of the state's population can elect a controlling majority
in the statehouse. (Of course, the relationship between the total deviation and the size of a
possible controlling majority not only depends upon the total deviation - which only takes
account of the largest and smallest district - but the size of the districts in between as well.)
87. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964) ("Under the existing provisions,
applying 1960 census figures, only 25. 1% of the State's total population resided in districts
represented by a majority of the members of the Senate, and only 25.7% lived in counties
which could elect a majority of the members of the House of Representatives."); MCKAY,
supra note 9, at 46-47 (listing the minimum percentage of the population that can elect a
majority of representatives in each of the fifty state legislative bodies). McKay discusses the
common use of this measure of quantitative dilution, known as the Dauer-Kelsay measure of
representativeness, and its use by the Supreme Court. Id. at 43-45.
As Guy Charles recently argued, the one person, one vote standard may also be
grounded in other core concepts of democracy, such as responsiveness, substantial political
equality, and pluralism. See Charles, supra note 85, at 1 148-62. But some of these concepts,
like responsiveness, do not require strict adherence to the standard, and the others require
making fairly obvious choices in democratic theory (that is, they do not appear to be "core"
concepts common to all theories of democracy).Charles does not deny this; indeed, he be
lieves that "judges can - and must - utilize democratic theory" in interpreting the Consti
tution. Id. at 1162.
88. See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411,
1420-27 (2002) (arguing that the Court could have fleshed out its notion of equality in at
least four different ways, but did not do so); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A
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Many conclude, correctly, I think, that the Court never offers a coher
ent theoretical basis for the standard.89 And so when Heather Gerken
calls the Court's j ustifications at best "minimally theorized,"90 she is
being quite charitable.
2.

Limitations and Criticisms ofthe Standard

Despite its basic appeal, the equiproportional standard is not with
out its limitations. Initially, the standard does not apply to many im
portant political institutions. The most obvious example is the U.S.
Senate.91 Under our constitutional structure, the two senators from
Wyoming represent 495,304 people while the two from California rep
resent 33,930,798.92 This exception to the one person, one vote stan
dard was constitutionalized as part of the compromise necessary to get
the less populous colonies to join the Union.93 And because each
state's power in the Electoral College is derived, in part, from its rep
resentation in the Senate, the standard also does not apply to the
Presidency.94 This, of course, helps explain the possibility that a presi
dential candidate may win the popular vote but lose the election.95
And, as discussed more fully below, on the state and local level there
are a host of special-purpose districts that are not subject to the one
person, one vote standard.96
Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1307-21 (2002) (discussing the standard as
possibly restoring the dignity of an individual's vote, the possibility of competition in elec
tions, and "accurate" representation).

89. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 88, at 1434-36.
90. Id. at 1427-28.
91. See U. S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. For some critiques of this aspect of the Senate, see
ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC Is THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 46-54 (2002) ;
Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 95 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) .
92. See MILLS, supra note 41, at 2 tbl.l.
93. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 571-77 ( 1964) (explaining the unique historical
circumstances that gave rise to the United States Senate and rejecting the federal analogy in
cases of state reapportionment); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9-14 ( 1964) (explaining
what became known as the "Great Compromise" that broke the deadlock between delegates
from large and small states at the Constitutional Convention); HACKER, supra note 16, at 34.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
95. This has now happened four times in American history: 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000.
Mark A. Siegel, It's Time to Reform Electoral College Before Next Crisis, ROLL CALL, Jan.
15, 2001 , at B34.
96. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 ( 1981 ) (exempting a water-storage district from
the strict demands of one person, one vote); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U. S. 719 ( 1973 ) (same). For a more thorough discussion, see infra text ac
companying notes 1 86-203.
The equiproportional standard also does not apply to judicial elections. See Wells v.
Edward, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454 (M.D. La. 1972 ) , affd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 ( 1973 ) (affirming
the district court's determination that one person, one vote does not apply to the judiciary).
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Even the legislative bodies that the standard was designed for state legislatures and Congress - are not required to adhere precisely
to the one person, one vote standard.97 State legislative districts may
deviate up to 10% without justification, more if the state provides suf
ficient reasons for the range.98 Congressional districts, while equally
sized within each state, vary quite a bit from state to state because the
Constitution prohibits congressional districts from crossing state bor
ders.99 As a result, after the most recent round of redistricting, the
congressional district in Wyoming has a population of 495,304, while
the one in Montana has a population of 905,316.100 Thus, the first im
portant limit on the one person, one vote principle is that many of our
most basic institutions are not subject to the standard at all and others
that are subject to it have a fair amount of flexibility in how they ad
here to it.
For the democratic institutions that are subject to the standard, the
elegance of the phrase "one person, one vote" masks some complexi
ties. The foremost among these is what, exactly, is meant by "person."
To put it another way, what apportionment base should we use to en
sure equal representation? A list of possible candidates, from most to
least comprehensive, includes total population,101 voting-age popula
tion,102 voter-eligible population,103 registered voters, and actual vot-

97. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 741-43 (1973) (explaining two distinct lines
of cases concerning congressional redistricting and state legislative apportionment).
98. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
324-25, 329, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973) (suggesting that a 16.4% maximum deviation
"may well approach tolerable limits").
99. This presumably comes out of the mandate that "Representatives . . . shall be appor
tioned among the several States . . . . " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2.
100. See Mills, supra note 41, at 1, 4.
101. In the early malapportionment cases, the disparities were analyzed in terms of dif
ferences in the population per representative or the percentage of the population that could
elect a controlling majority in the statehouse. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
102. For a discussion of the possibility of using voting-age population to limit the appor
tionment base, see Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773-77 (9th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting apportionment based on numbers of voting-age citizens).
103. This would limit the pool to those who were both of voting age and not disqualified
by some other state voting requirement. The most notable groups excluded from the appor
tionment base would be aliens, transients, and those convicted of certain crimes. For a dis
cussion of the possibility of using citizenship voting requirements to limit the apportionment
base, see Garza, 918 F.2d at 773-76; id. at 779-88 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dis
senting in part); Dennis L. Murphy, Note, The Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from the Reappor
tionment Base: A Question of Representation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969 (1991) (arguing
that the inclusion of illegal aliens in the reapportionment base violates one person, one
vote). For a short discussion of disenfranchised felons and ex-felons in the apportionment
base, see Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes on Account of Their
Children?: Toward a Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 503, 530-31 (2000). For a general discussion of the effects of including (and excluding)
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ers.104 And while the Supreme Court originally spoke of equal num
bers of "residents, or citizens, or voters,"105 as if equal numbers of each
guaranteed the same sort of equality, the Court later acknowledged
that they do not, reasoning that "if it is the weight of a person's vote
that matters, total population . . . may not actually reflect that body of
voters whose votes must be counted and weighed for the purposes of
reapportionment, because 'census persons' are not voters."106 While
the Court seems to have settled on total population as the relevant sta
tistic for congressional redistricting,107 it allows states significant lee
way in devising an apportionment base for state and local voting dis
tricts.108 But these variations may be at odds with the phrase itself and
affect the weighting of votes (and, in any case, are not without contro
versy).109
Once we accept the relevant figure for determining district size
(usually, population), we are still a long way from guaranteeing each
person numerically equal representation. The main obstacle is that the
source of the population figures - the census - has several short
comings for districting purposes. Initially, census numbers are far from
various non-voting groups from the apportionment base, see Levinson, supra note 88, at
1281-97.
104. Use of registered or actual voters as the apportionment base has not been much of
an issue since the Supreme Court noted a possible "problem" with the use of a registered
voter base or actual voter base. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966). The Court
found that such bases were unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny because they may be subject
to improper political influence that perpetuates the underrepresentation of some minority
groups and because they are subject to sudden fluctuations. See id. at 92-93.
105. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577; see New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S.
688, 693 ( 1989) ("Electoral systems should strive to make each citizen's portion equal." (em

phasis added)).
106. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 7 35, 746 (1973); see Burns, 384 U.S. at 91-93;
Garza, 918 F.2d at 773-76; id. at 779-88 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
107. This appears to be mandated by the constitutional requirement that the "whole
number of free persons" in each state shall be used to apportion representatives, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, and much of the language in
the congressional apportionment cases, see, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 ( 1964). But
see Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 ( 1969) (assuming without deciding that con
gressional apportionment may be based on voter population rather than total population).
108. See, e.g., Burns, 384 U.S. at 91 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require
the States to use total population figures derived from the federal census as the standard by
which this substantial population equivalency is to be measured."). The Court went on to
note that in no case had it suggested that "the States are required to include aliens, tran
sients, short term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime,
in the apportionment base by which the legislators are distributed and against which compli
ance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured." Id. at 92.
109. Sanford Levinson points out some even more basic problems with what he terms
the "mantra" of one person, one vote. He notes that it "does not - indeed cannot, as a mat
ter of common sense - mean that every single person within the polity gets a (single) vote."
Levinson, supra note 88, at 1270-71. Children, felons, and resident aliens, among others,
have no federally protected right to vote. See id. at 1271-7 3.
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perfect.110 The census overcounts some populations, undercounts oth
ers, and is prohibited from correcting systemic errors of this sort
through statistical techniques such as sampling.111 As a result, areas
with large numbers of people missed by the census, often with large
minority populations, are numerically underrepresented.112 And even
assuming a perfect decennial census, those numbers only provide a
snapshot of a dynamic demographic process. The census numbers
rapidly become outdated as people are born, die, and move.113 Of
course, a few imperfections in the census are far from a reason to dis
card the whole enterprise, for any undertaking of that size is bound to
have some slippage. But such imperfections do swamp the precise tol
erances built into the law governing some types of redistricting.114
The most serious shortcoming of the equiproportional standard,
however, is not its limited range or imperfect application, but its fail
ure to achieve the goal of equal representation. The Warren Court, in
concentrating on individual voting equality, overlooked the group na
ture of meaningful political representation.115 So in the late 1960s,
while our democratic institutions reconfigured themselves into dis
tricts that equalized individual voting power, they also employed prac
tices like at-large elections and racial gerrymandering to effectively

110. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745 & n.10.
111. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1997); Samuel
Issacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and Minority Representation: The
Constitutional Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal Representation, 13 REV. L!TIG. 1,
2-13 (1993). When the Census Bureau announced a plan to use statistical sampling in the
decennial census of 2000 to remedy the growing problem of undercounting some identifiable
groups, the plan was challenged and held invalid under the Census Act, 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-401
(2000), in Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316
(1999). Indeed, the mere fact that sampling is so politically contested lends support to the
idea that there is nothing objective about the one person, one vote standard.
112. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745 n.10 (noting the fact that the 1970 census under
counted blacks by an estimated 7.7% and whites by an estimated 1 .9%).
113. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98-100 (1997); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 746.
Sanford Levinson notes that the population numbers used for congressional elections are
only good for, at best, one election in the five covered by each new set of census data. See
Levinson, supra note 88, at 1278-80.
114. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("More than a
decade's experience with Kirkpatrick demonstrates that insistence on precise numerical
equality only invites those who Jost in the political arena to refight their battles in federal
court."); Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 735 ("While the Jaw requires that dis
trict populations be as equal as practicable, nobody really sues because the congressional
district to which he has been assigned has 527,472 voters while another district has only
523,798."); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1730 (1993) [hereinafter Karlan, The Rights To Vote] (describing one
person, one vote claims as " 'vehicle lawsuits,' empty of any real content but pregnant with
the possibility of persuading a court to adopt a favorable new plan").
1 15. See GUINIER, supra note 2, at 124-25.
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shut certain groups out of the political process.116 These new practices,
which "qualitatively" diluted votes, became the new constitutional and
statutory battleground for voting rights.117 Thus, as it turned out, even
if the equiproportional standard is a necessary condition for achieving
the goal of fair and effective representation, it is far from a sufficient
one.118 And judged by the lofty goals set for the standard by its crea
tors, it has been, in Pam Karlan's words, "a spectacular failure."119
1 16. See DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, supra note 19, at 22 ("A mathemati
cally equal vote which is politically worthless because of gerrymandering or winner-take-all
districting is as deceiving as 'emperor's clothes.' "); Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme
Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and
Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277 (examining the relationship between the
requirement of population equity and gerrymandering); Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1654

(explaining how advances in computer technology make it easier to gerrymander equipopu
lous districts); Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 736 (noting that "[t]he 'equi
populous gerrymander' is a staple of modern reapportionment").
117. Originally, in cases such as Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), and White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), qualitative vote dilution claims were pursued under the Con
stitution. After the constitutional claims were undercut by the Supreme Court's opinion in
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (requiring that plaintiffs with such claims prove
discriminatory intent), Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when it came
up for reauthorization in 1982 to include qualitative dilution claims. Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1973 (2000)). Thereafter, section 2 became the weapon of choice for voting rights advocates.
Constitutional qualitative vote dilution claims brought by white plaintiffs rose to prominence
in the 1990s, most notoriously in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For a very brief sum
mary of qualitative vote dilution, see Hayden, supra note 4, at 94-98.
1 18. See Baker, One Person, One Vote, supra note 9, at 90; Barbara Y. Phillips, Recon
sidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote
Dilution Claims, 38 How. L.J. 561, 564-65 (1995).
119. Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 114, at 1705. Chief Justice Earl Warren
considered the reapportionment cases the most important in his sixteen years on the Court.
See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 337 (1982); Engstrom, supra note
116, at 277.
This does not, of course, exhaust the possible shortcomings of the equiproportional
standard. See, e.g., ALFRED DE GRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1963) (cataloging some early predictions about the negative consequences
of Baker v. Carr); Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist's Perspective,
32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1 110 (1999) (arguing that applying the one person, one vote
standard to local governments prevents the formation of the regional governmental entities
necessary to solve problems like growth and traffic management); Alfred De Grazia, The
Applied Science of Equality: The Case of Apportionment, with Special Attention to the Idea of
£qui-Populous Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION, supra note 9, at

169, 188-89 (arguing that the equiproportional standard is a bad idea because, among other
things, it takes power away from the legislature, runs contrary to our federalist system of
government, and takes attention away from more serious issues); James A. Gardner, One
Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1239-43
(2002) (arguing that one person, one vote cannot support "thicker" conceptions of democ
racy such as communitarianism and civic republicanism); James L. McDowell, "One Person,
One Vote" and the Decline of Community, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 131 (1999) (arguing that the
equiproportional standard contributed to the decline of the concept of community of inter
est); Joseph Seliga, Democratic Solutions to Urban Problems, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 5
(2001) (arguing that "the need to ensure equality of votes consistent with the 'one person,
one vote' doctrine hinders the development of democratic governing structures and innova
tive solutions to urban problems").
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In sum, the theoretical arguments for and against the equipropor
tional standard are unsatisfying. One reason they disappoint, I think, is
that they fail to go far enough. For example, Justice Frankfurter was
clearly onto something when he said that the Court in Baker v. Carr
was being asked "to choose among competing bases of representation
- ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philoso
phy . . . . "120 But it is unclear exactly why Frankfurter framed the ques
tion this way. Why is such a choice about bases of representation dif
ferent from the other acceptable choices the Court made in deciding
that states could not altogether deny the vote to certain groups? An
other shortcoming is that the current explanations appear unrelated to
other aspects of voting rights, such as those involving access to the
ballot box on one hand and qualitative vote dilution on the other.
Thus, while I think commentators like Barbara Phillips are right in
pointing out that quantitative and qualitative dilution claims must be
related,121 there is little explanation of how they are related. The whole
subject demands a more thorough, perhaps more deeply rooted, ex
planation.
A more satisfying explanation of the standard would clarify the
relationship between weighting votes and democratic fairness. In do
ing so, it would need to tie the one person, one vote standard to other
aspects of voting rights. It would, for example, connect the standard to
the reasons invoked to disallow certain people to vote in the first
place. It would help explain why we allow deviations from the stan
dard in some cases. And, perhaps most importantly, it may even allow
us to bridge the gap between quantitative vote dilution claims and
qualitative ones. Many jurists and commentators view these two types
of vote dilution claims as distinct concepts - the former involving
"individual rights" and the latter "group rights." They are, therefore,
treated differently under the law, and seem related only in the vague
sense that each involves an allocation of political power. A more com
plete, unified theory of voting rights would tie the two types of claims
together at some more fundamental level.
Such a theory, I think, must come out of an analysis of why we
think it is a good idea to assign every voter an equally weighted vote.
Voting, after all, involves revealing preferences, and counting votes
involves aggregating those preferences. It seems, then, that figuring
out how much weight should be given to a person's vote means figur
ing out how much weight should be accorded to each person's prefer
ences. And because there is apparently no scale for weighing prefer120. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121. See Phillips, supra note 118, at 583; see also John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional
Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 163-64, 175-82 (1999) (noting
the false distinction between the individual rights protected in the quantitative dilution cases
and the group rights protected in the qualitative ones).
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ences, we need to weigh them in relation to each other. And that, in
turn, brings us to something that has been giving philosophers and
economists fits for a long time - the problem of making interpersonal
utility comparisons.
II.

A.

INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS

The Problem of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

A necessary element of many ethical systems, especially utilitarian
ones, is the ability to measure utility, broadly conceived as people's
well-being.122 Any measure of well-being involves comparing the
amount of goods people possess. With material goods - such as in
come, wealth, and physical health - making such comparisons is not
that difficult. While there may be problems in measuring the amount
of any material good possessed by a particular individual (indeed,
there are entire subdisciplines devoted to the task), the difficulties are
mostly practical rather than theoretical.123 In any case, the problems
pale in comparison with the difficulties associated with making com
parisons of more subjective goods.
Comparisons of subjective goods involve looking at things such as
people's mental health, their freedom from anxiety, their sense of sat
isfaction - in short, their levels of happiness.124 Because we don't like
the paternalism (and the mistakes) involved in telling people what
should make them happy, we often take people's own preferences as
the baseline of the inquiry and assess their well-being by looking at
whether these preferences are satisfied.125 Thus, the project involves
122. For a good, brief discussion of the concept of utility and its relationship to welfare,
see Alfred F. MacKay, Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 83 J.
PHIL. 305, 306-07 (1986).
123. See Martin Barrett & Daniel Hausman, Making Interpersonal Comparisons Coher
ently, 6 ECON . & PHIL. 293, 293 (1990).
1 24. See id.
125. See Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,
104 MIND 415, 415 (1995) [hereinafter Hausman I]. Hausman discusses this view, criticizes it,
and concludes that we should not equate welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. Id. at
486. His position was criticized by Ruth Weintraub in The Impossibility of Interpersonal
Utility Comparisons: A Critical Note, 105 MIND 661 (1996), and defended (successfully, I
think) in Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
A
Reply, 106 MIND 99 (1997) [hereinafter Hausman II ]. That said, preference satisfaction, or
versions of it, is still one of the most often used measures of well-being, see Barrett &
Hausman, supra note 123, at 293-94; see also Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Inter
personal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WE LL-BEIN G 17, 22-44 (Jon
Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991), and also seems appropriate in the context of voting
rights, where the goal is to translate individual preferences into group choices. But while I
use preference satisfaction because it is one of the most well-investigated means to make
interpersonal comparisons, my argument does not depend upon it as opposed to some other
measure of well-being that turns, in some sense, on psychological goods. Nor, I should men
tion, does my basic point depend upon the difference between the "actual" preferences used
by economists and the "rational" or "informed" preferences used by ethical theorists.
-
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comparing, say, Luke's level of satisfaction of his preferences with
Emma's level of satisfaction of hers. Such interpersonal comparisons
of preference satisfaction are crucial to giving a full account of well
being because people may possess similar amounts of material goods
but experience different levels of satisfaction - some may be com
pletely satisfied and others very dissatisfied.126 Making assessments of
such psychological goods, however, involves tackling a host of difficul
ties in what is collectively known as the problem with interpersonal
utility comparisons.127
The overarching problem with interpersonal utility comparisons is,
quite simply, that we cannot make them without making the value
j udgments we seek to avoid. This makes the distribution of material
goods problematic. If, for example, we want to choose a single dessert
for Luke and Emma, we could ask them whether they prefer jello or
ice cream. If they both prefer one or the other, then our decision is
easy. But if Luke prefers jello, and Emma prefers ice cream, things be
come harder. At that point, we would want to determine whether jello
is higher in Luke's preference ranking than ice cream is in Emma's.
But making such interpersonal comparisons is fraught with difficulties.
As Lionel Robbins recognized in the early 1930s:
There is no means of testing the magnitude of A 's satisfaction as compared
with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-streams, that would be a
test of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to meas

ure what is going on in B's mind, nor B to measure what is going on in

A's. There is no way of comparing the satisfactions of different people.1 28

Robbins's point was not new - a similar point was made, for example,
by Jevons in 1871129 - but it seized the imaginations of a generation
126. Or, as the Beatles pointed out more succinctly, "Money can't buy me love" - or
many other subjective goods that contribute to well-being. THE BEATLES, CAN'T BUY ME
LOVE (Capi tol Records 1964).
127. One of the best places to start investigating the problems associated with interper
sonal utility comparisons is INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note
125, which contains a well-written introduction as well as a good cross section of the scholar
ship on the issue. James Griffin steps through some of the more obvious problems in JAMES
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 1 13-20
(1986). And Peter Hammond provides a particularly useful bibliography in Peter J.
Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should Be
Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 125, at 200, 238-54.
Despite the obvious connection to any study of law and economics, there has not been
an overwhelming amount of commentary on interpersonal utility comparisons among legal
scholars. For a relatively brief discussion of the role of interpersonal utility comparisons in
law and economics, see Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 60-71
(1992).
128. LORD ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE 139-40 (3d ed. 1984).
129. See W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (5th ed. 1965).
Jevons noted:
[T]here is never, in any single instance, an attempt to compare the amount of feeling in one
mind with that in another. I see no means by which such comparison can be accomplished.
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(or two) of economists. Faced with the fact that interpersonal utility
comparisons are based on unverifiable evidence, economists struc
tured their views of efficiency and social welfare accordingly.°0 This
reluctance to make interpersonal comparisons, for example, accounts
for the prominence (or dominance) of Pareto optimality as a method
of making social-welfare comparisons.131 And the fact that such meth
ods are re.latively feeble makes finding a solution to the problem of in
terpersonal utility comparisons all the more pressing.

The susceptibility of one mind may, for what we know, be a thousand times greater than that
of another. But provided that the susceptibility was different in a like ratio in all directions,
we should never be able to discover the difference. Every mind is thus inscrutable to every
other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be possible . . . . [T]he motive
in one mind is weighed only against other motives in the same mind, never against the mo
tives in other minds.
Id. at 14.

Except for some of the terminology, Jevons's quote may just have well come out of a re
cent issue of Mind.
130. See Barrett & Hausman, supra note 123, at 293-94. For a brief sketch of the history
of the avoidance of interpersonal utility comparisons, see Hammond, supra note 127, at 20407. Amartya Sen provides a useful survey of the literature of social choice theory without
interpersonal comparisons in Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS 1073 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986) .
Law and economics scholars have, for the most part, embraced the typical distaste for in
terpersonal utility comparisons. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 79 ( 1981) ("The 'interpersonal comparison of utilities' is anathema to the modem
economist, and rightly so, because there is no metric for making such a comparison."). But
see Richard A. Epstein, Rights and Rights Talk, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1118 ( 1992 ) (book
review) (acknowledging that "(m]ost of us are quite happy to make such (interpersonal util
ity] comparisons, and do so with confidence, every day of our lives"). For a general discus
sion, see Lawson, supra note 127, at 61 n.26 (citing a variety of sources discussing the inter
personal comparison of utilities, including sources arguing that such comparison is not
impossible).
131. See Hammond, supra note 127, at 206. The Pareto Criterion, developed by Vilfredo
Pareto in 1897, is a method of determining whether a change in a given state of affairs is effi
cient or "optimal." Simply put, a change is said to increase the welfare of society if at least
one member of the group is made better off without anyone being made worse off. Though
Pareto's criterion is somewhat limited, it does have the advantage of avoiding interpersonal
comparisons. As James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock point out:

The underlying premise of the modern Paretian construction is the purely individualistic
one. The individual himself is assumed to be the only one who is able to measure or to quan
tify his own utility or satisfaction. No external observer is presumed able to make compari
sons of utility among separate individuals.
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 17 1-72 ( 1962) . The disadvantage of reli
ance on Pareto optimality, however, is its incompleteness. As Sen notes:
An economy can be optimal in this sense even when some people are rolling in luxury and
others are near starvation as long as the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting
into the pleasures of the rich. If preventing the burning of Rome would have made Emperor
Nero feel worse off, then letting him burn Rome would have been Pareto optimal. In short, a
society or an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting.
AMARTY A K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 22 ( 1970) .
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One possible way to solve the problem is to limit our inquiry to or
dinal, not cardinal, preference rankings.132 For example, we could eas
ily find out whether Luke prefers jello to ice cream (as opposed to how
much more he prefers it): we could run a series of experiments that
force him to choose between the two, or, more simply, we could ask
him. And, say, we find out that Luke prefers jello to ice cream. Simi
larly, we can discover Emma's (or anyone else's) ordinal preference
ranking with respect to the two desserts (and, say she, unlike Luke,
prefers ice cream to jello ). At least theoretically, we could do this with
their preferences over any goods or states of affairs. Then, with a
complete ordering of both individuals' preferences in hand, we could
compare the two and make our decision about whether to buy jello or
ice cream.
Such a comparison might take different forms. We could, for ex
ample, count the levels in between jello and ice cream in both prefer
ence orders (which would, of course, include preferences for many
other things), and then decide that, because Luke has fewer prefer
ence levels between jello and ice cream, he must be more indifferent
about the choice than Emma. Hence, we buy the ice cream. Or we
could count up from the very bottom (or down from the top) of each
child's preference ranking to discern who would derive more satisfac
tion by the choice of their favored dessert.133 Thus, if we restrict our
selves to ordinal preference rankings, it seems we can, at least theo
retically, make the interpersonal utility comparisons that we desire.
Closer scrutiny of this process, however, reveals the many assump
tions (and flaws) inherent in such comparisons of ordinal preference
rankings. While it may be easy to imagine a fully satisfied or dissatis
fied person, what about all of the intermediate preference rankings how does one locate such a preference ranking in a way that lends it
self to meaningful comparison? Counting from the extremes, or be
tween two alternatives, is easier said than done. One problem is that,
once you include lotteries among alternatives as well as alternatives,
there are an infinite number of levels in anyone's preference rank
ings.134 Another problem is that the number of alternatives above or
below a given choice might depend on morally irrelevant factors, such
as one's knowledge or capacity for imagination.135 If, in the example
above, we restrict ourselves to desserts, Luke's knowledge of or ca
pacity to imagine more desserts than Emma may help him if we're
counting up from the bottom of both preference orders (since, pre132. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 475-77.
133. See id. at 476. Of course, without any evidence that Luke and Emma have exactly
the same number of preferences in their rankings, counting up from the bottom and down
from the top of each ranking might yield different results.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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sumably, jello will be further from his bottom than ice cream from
Emma's bottom) or counting the alternatives between jello and ice
cream (his many as opposed to Emma's few), but may hurt him if
we're counting down from the top (since, given Emma's limited
imagination, ice cream may be closer to her top). Finally, Luke,
Emma, and the rest of us are often tempted to misrepresent our pref
erences in order to gain more of a scarce good, be it dessert or some
thing with which you can buy dessert, like a tax break.136
These problems tell us that although they may be enough to get
market analysis off the ground, ordinal utilities are not the way to
make interpersonal utility comparisons.137 They also demonstrate that
counting the alternatives above, below, or between are really attempts
to assign quasi-cardinal significance to certain differences in individual
rankings. Making judgments based on the number of steps between
preference levels assumes we are talking about equally sized steps.
Such quasi-cardinal rankings, however, don't make sense. In the first
place, they are not stable, in that adding (or removing) an option in
creases (or diminishes) the distinctions among some options but not
others. In addition, quasi-cardinal rankings are not, generally, consis
tent with a person's actual cardinal rankings. In sum, we cannot make
interpersonal comparisons without comparing preference intervals,
and these quasi-cardinal systems do not contain the right information
- we need cardinal rankings. Thus, we must reject this stripped-down,
ordinal version of interpersonal utility comparison.
A second way of solving the problem involves moving to full
blown cardinal utilities. That is, we need to look at each person's car
dinal scale and then calibrate it with the scales of others. The calibra
tion is, of course, the hard part, and economists and philosophers have
taken two basic approaches. Some attempt to convert the interper
sonal comparisons to intrapersonal comparisons. Others attempt to
place preferences on a shared numerical scale, from zero (least pre
ferred) to one (most preferred).
Converting interpersonal comparisons to intrapersonal ones in
volves putting oneself in another's shoes in order to make a compari
son.138 In order to compare what it would be like to be Luke with jello
to Emma with ice cream, we imagine what it would be like to be him
with jello and what it would be like to be her with ice cream. We then
convert those difficult interpersonal comparisons into intrapersonal
ones, which are, by most accounts, less problematic.139 It is not that
136. This problem is by no means limited to comparisons of ordinal utility levels.
137. I am especially indebted to Stephen Ellis for the discussion in this paragraph.
138. A good critical discussion of this solution (and its many versions) may be found in
MacKay, supra note 122, at 305-22; see also Hausman I, supra note 125, at 477-78.
139. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 477-78; MacKay, supra note 122, at 305-06. But
see Gregory S. Kavka, Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?, 7
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controversial, for example, for me to say that Luke is better off with
jello than ice cream if and only if he prefers jello to ice cream (in
trapersonal comparison). Likewise, I can make comparisons between
people by saying that Luke is better off with jello than Emma is with
ice cream (interpersonal comparison) if and only if I prefer Luke with
jello to Emma with ice cream (intrapersonal comparison).140 Impor
tantly, when making this conversion, I leave my personal preferences
behind: that is, I imagine myself as Luke, with Luke's preferences and
a bowl of jello; I imagine myself as Emma, with Emma's preferences
and a bowl of ice cream; and then I ask myself in whose position I
would prefer to be.141 Thus, by engaging in what Alfred MacKay color
fully calls the "mental shoehorn maneuver,"142 I can make interper
sonal utility comparisons.
This is the principal way that philosophers and welfare economists
have dealt with interpersonal comparisons. Kenneth Arrow,143 R.M.
Hare,144 and John Harsanyi,145 for example, have put forth versions of
it.146 Some, like Hare, believe that the maneuver can be made in such a
way as to actually induce the experiences of others in oneself in order
to compare them.147 Others, like Harsanyi, make the milder claim that
the maneuver merely places one in position to make a certain counter
factual judgment, that if I were in Luke's position with his preferences,
I would have such an experience.148 And while many express doubts

ECON. & PHIL. 143, 143-45 (1991) (arguing that, on certain assumptions, all of the problems
with social choice reappear at the personal level).
140. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 477.
141. Id.
142. MacKay, supra note 122, at 305 & n.l.
143. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social
Choice, 7 PHILOSOPHIA 223, 223-37 (1978). Arrow, however, admits of some lurking prob

lems in the approach:
[I]f your satisfaction depends on some inner qualities that I do not possess, then I really have
not had the experience which will enable me to judge the satisfaction one would derive from
that quality in association with some distribution of goods. Hence, my judgment has a prob
ability element in it and therefore will not agree with your judgment.
Id. at 236.
144. See R .M . HARE, MORAL THINKING 87-106, 117-29 (1981).
145. See, e.g., JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING
EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 58-59 (1977); John C. Harsanyi, Morality
and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 Soc. RES. 623, 638 (1977).
146. There are, of course, other adherents. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 14-15 (1973); Donald Davidson, Judging Interpersonal Interests, in
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (J. Eisler & A. Hylland eds., 1986).
147. See HARE, supra note 144, at 117-21.
148. See HARSANYI, supra note 145, at 58. While Amartya Sen points out that there are

at least two versions of this type of maneuver (which he terms "introspective welfare com
parison" and "introspective as if choice"), see Amartya Sen, Interpersonal Comparisons of

242

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:213

about the enterprise, they often see it as the most promising way to
make interpersonal comparisons - and the moral systems that de
pend upon them - work.
The solution, however, is subject to many criticisms, and may ulti
mately fail to give a coherent account of interpersonal comparisons. It
is too information intensive to use on a large scale: we lack this kind of
data on each person's preference rankings149 and, even if we could get
it (through polling or some other device), we would worry about stra
tegic misrepresentations of those preferences. Moreover, one's imag
ining about what it is like to be another person is often contaminated
by her thoughts about the kind of changes she would have to undergo
to get there.150 But the most straightforward criticism is that, to the ex
tent I can put myself in another's shoes, there is no "me" left to make
the comparison.151 That is, I may be able to imagine what Luke thinks
of jello and Emma thinks of ice cream, but I still cannot compare the
intensities of their subjective states with any authority, especially the
introspective authority I seek when converting interpersonal compari
sons to intrapersonal ones. So whatever the process is called - imagi
native empathy, extended utility functions, or extended sympathy - it
fails to successfully bridge the gap in a way that solves the problem of
interpersonal utility comparisons.
Many theorists have attempted to solve the problem by using some
sort of shared index to calibrate people's cardinal preference scales. In
order to be at all useful, an index of cardinal utilities must be bounded,
for otherwise the number of preferences above and below any given
alternative would be infinite, making it impossible to make compari
sons.152 Thus, a numerical range must bind these preferences. Using
the example above - with Luke, Emma, and their choices of desserts
- we make interpersonal comparisons by comparing the following ra
tios:153
U (icecream) - min Ue
maxUe -minUe

Welfare, in ECONOMICS AND HUMAN WELFARE 183, 1 86-88 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1979),

the difference is, I think, irrelevant for our purposes.
149. See Jon Elster & John E. Roemer, Introduction to INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS
OF WELL-BEING, supra note 125, at 1, 12.
150. See id. at 1 1-12 ("When we think of what it would be like to be handicapped, we
are almost unavoidably affected by the thought of what it would be like to become handi
capped.").
151. See MacKay, supra note 122, at 321-22; see also James Griffin, Against the Taste
Model, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 125, at 45, 52-59.
152. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 479.
153. See id. at 480.
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U 1 (jel/o ) - min U 1
max U 1 -min U 1

Where preference satisfaction is the measure of utility, the most
common way to gauge it is to use the "zero-one rule," assigning a
value of "O" to the bottoms of everyone's utility functions and "1" to
the tops (this also makes those equations child's play, since the de
nominator becomes " 1").154 Once one has the "correct" cardinal repre
sentations of Luke's and Emma's (or anyone's) preferences, then
those numbers may be used to make interpersonal utility compari
sons.155 And if one is committed to preference satisfaction as a meas
ure of well-being, the zero-one rule solves the problem of interper
sonal comparisons of utilities.
The zero-one rule, however, has been criticized as both false and
unfair. Normalizing everyone's top and bottom is false because it ig
nores the fact that some people may be capable of experiencing
greater satisfaction, or greater dissatisfaction, than others.156 To use
Daniel Hausman's example, suppose a scientist placed uncalibrated
thermometers in different liquids (water, ethanol, benzene, etc.),
marked the location on the thermometers where each liquid boiled
and froze, and then normalized those intervals using the zero-one
rule.157 He would then be able to make claims that, after storing water
and ethanol in the same room for a long time, the ethanol is higher up
on its "temperature" scale - "hotter" - than the water.158 Yet the
ethanol and water are the same temperature. The scientist made an

154. See id. In the example above, this would make both Luke's and Emma's maxU, 1
and their minU, 0. At that point, if we figured out that, on these scales, Luke's utility from
jello is .65 and Emma's from ice cream is .75, we should choose ice cream (since .75 is greater
than .65).
=

=

155. See id.
156. See GRIFFIN, supra note 127, at 120; WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST
POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 1 11 (1982); Hausman I, supra note 125, at 485. But see Frederic
Schick, Beyond Utilitarianism, 68 J. PHIL. 657, 665-66 (1971). Schick explains that, even if
true, different capacities for satisfaction or dissatisfaction should not matter to us:
Some people are said to be capable of greater intensities of feeling than others. The mean
ing of this is in doubt, and so of course also its truth. But however the claim is understood, I
do not see why it should concern us. Adam values his summum bonum as highly as he values
anything, and his summum ma/um is for him the worst of all possibilities. The same is true
for Eve. When then should Adam's voice on his extrema be given any weight different from
that given Eve's voice on hers? Suppose that the two did differ in their capacities for inten
sity, and indeed differed vastly - why should a fanatic count for more than a person with
tired blood? I see no reason why he should, and so have equalized the limits of the utility
ranges.
Id.

157. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 486-87.
158. See id.
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error by normalizing the thermometer scales using the zero-one rule.159
The rule, then, is false with respect to utility comparisons because just
as different liquids have different boiling and freezing points, "[i)t is
not the case that we all reach the same peaks and valleys."160
Although using the zero-one rule to normalize everyone's prefer
ence structure may seem to culminate in the fair treatment of indi
viduals, it may actually produce the opposite result. If we use compari
sons based on the rule to distribute goods, for example, the greedy (or
more imaginative) will benefit at the expense of the selfless (or less
imaginative) . 161 As Peter Hammond explains:
Consider some undemanding person who achieves his upper bound at a
low level of consumption. Do we normalize that person's utility scale so
that it has the same upper and lower bounds as that of a greedy person?
If so, and if we distribute goods to each individual so that each achieves,
say,

90% of maximum utility (which is now a well-defined utility level),

then the greedy person is likely to be given much more than one feels he
1
deserves. 62

John Rawls also notices the potential price exacted by this solution
to interpersonal comparisons, noting that "the zero-one rule implies
that, other things equal, greater social utility results from educating
people to have simple desires and to be easily satisfied . . . . "163 Thus, a
preference-satisfaction model of utility and its commitment to the
zero-one rule may, oddly enough, give rise to unfair distributions of
goods and perverse social incentives.
B.

Value Judgments in Interpersonal Comparisons

The alternative to the zero-one rule, of course, is to place every
one's preferences on some other, less restrictive universal scale, so
that comparisons may be made between them. That is, instead of nor
malizing the bottoms and tops of everyone's preference rankings by
assigning them the same numbers (such as zero and one), we place
them on a more wide-ranging scale. On this view:
We are not forced to say that " 'extent to which preferences are satisfied'
is simply position in a preference ranking". We can say instead that it is a
measure of the intensity of my preference satisfaction; of how high up on

159. See id.
160. GRIFFIN, supra note 127, at 120.
161. See Hammond, supra note 127, at 216; Hausman I, supra note 125, at 482.
162. Hammond, supra note 127, at 216.
163. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284 (2nd ed. 1999). This problem stems from
assigning too much weight to aspiration levels, and is related to the "happy slave" phenome
non in which people adapt to their current circumstances by lowering their expectations (or
aspirations). See Elster & Roemer, supra note 149, at 6.
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the universal scale of preference satisfaction I am . . . . A person may be
164

at the top of his ranking without being at the top of the universal scale.

If Luke, for example, has a greater capacity for satisfaction or more
intense desires than Emma with regard to dessert, his preference for
jello and ice cream may be represented by, say, 12 and 6 on some uni
versal scale, while Emma's preferences may be 0.9 and 1.2. It would
then be clear under many ethical systems that this small society of two
would be most satisfied by the choice of jello for dessert. This would at
least solve the apparent falsity of the relatively stifling zero-one rule
by accounting for the different strengths or intensities of people's
preferences.
Once everyone's preferences are placed on the universal scale, we
could attempt to solve the fairness problems that might be associated
with distributing scarce goods to those with greater capacities for satis
faction, and try to ferret out those who misrepresent their preferences
in order to secure more of a scarce good. We might decide that those
with greater capacities for satisfaction should get more, or we might
use notions like "informed preferences"165 or "primary goods"166 to
achieve an equitable distribution. In any case, once everyone's prefer
ences are represented on the universal scale, we would have an objec
tive starting point from which we could make interpersonal compari
sons and commence the ethical debates about how to distribute goods.
The problem with this solution is, of course, the one discussed in
the last several pages: we lack the kind of information that allows us to
place people's preferences on some objective, universal scale.167 We
cannot devise a universal scale for ordinal or cardinal utilities because
we lack the sort of direct access to the minds of others that we would
need to objectively ground our comparisons. There is no omniscient
social scientist with the ability to peer into all of our minds, assess our
preferences, and make comparisons. We seem, therefore, stuck (or,
back where we started): the zero-one rule is flawed because it assumes
we all have equal capacities for satisfaction, but we lack the kind of in
formation to objectively pin down just how to make comparisons be
tween people. In other words, we face the basic problem with inter
personal utility comparisons.
So what does all of this mean? Does it mean that we are not really
making interpersonal utility comparisons when we think we are? Or
164. Weintraub, supra note 125, at 662.
165. John Harsanyi has argued that normative decisions should be based on individuals'
rational, fully informed preferences. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic
Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 311 n.7 (1955).
166. John Rawls has argued that all citizens of a state should have some basic goods and
liberties, which he terms "primary goods." See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993); RAWLS, supra note 163.
167. See, e.g., Hausman II, supra note 125, at 99.
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that we should not be making such comparisons? Of course not. Peo
ple obviously make judgments involving interpersonal comparisons all
the time.168 Parents choosing dessert for their children, for example, do
their best to compare the strength or intensity of their children's pref
erences for jello and ice cream. Employers deciding whether to give
employees a raise or more vacation time assess which option their em
ployees favor and how strongly they favor it. Governments make
scores of redistribution decisions based, at least in part, upon assess
ments of where the distributed goods will bring about the greatest
utility, or satisfy the most people.
The important conclusion to be drawn from the problem of inter
personal utility comparisons, then, is not that one cannot make them,
but that they are, in a sense, value judgments necessarily involving
complex normative considerations.169 Even Lionel Robbins, whose
views on interpersonal comparisons prompted generations of moral
theorists and economists to avoid such comparisons, did not conclude
that they are impossible, just that it is silly to think they rest on a "sci
entific" basis.170 They cannot be tied down with the kind of neutral,
value-free empirical evidence that positivist philosophers and econo
mists desire.171 Once one accepts the fact that we cannot make mean
ingful interpersonal comparisons in a neutral manner, the problem of
making them begins to disappear. In a real sense, the desire to avoid
value judgments is the main problem of interpersonal comparisons.172
168. Indeed, Amartya Sen, in a decidedly optimistic moment, described the problem of
making systemic interpersonal comparisons of welfare as "not one of poverty, but of an em
barrassment of riches." See Sen, supra note 148, at 184. That moment notwithstanding, most
(or all) of the non-normative interpretations of interpersonal comparisons have been criti
cized on a number of grounds.
169. See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 220
supra note 127, at 1 19-20; Hammond, supra note 127, at 226, 236-37;
Scanlon, supra note 125, at 18, 44.

(1991 ); GRIFFIN,

170. See ROBBINS, supra note 128, at 140-41.
171. This is not to say that there are n o descriptive (that is, non-normative) interpreta
tions of interpersonal comparisons. There just are not any that are both descriptive and ade
quate. Sen, for example, catalogues three types of descriptive interpretations: behaviorism,
introspective welfare comparisons, and introspective as if choice. See Sen, supra note 148, at
185. The latter two interpretations are versions of the "mental shoehorn maneuver," and
thus share the problems of that approach, discussed supra text accompanying notes 138-151.
See Sen, supra note 148, at 186-88. Behaviorism involves using behavior as the basis for
making comparisons of mental states. Id. But such an interpretation of interpersonal com- ·
parisons depends upon the existence of some agreed-upon criteria linking behavior to men
tal states, which is something that we do not have, especially when it comes to more complex
mental states. See id. at 186. Behaviorism may also fail to deal satisfactorily with strategic
misrepresentations (people play-acting in order to secure more of a scarce good). So while a
behaviorist approach to interpersonal comparisons is a descriptive one, it, like the many ver
sions of the mental shoehorn maneuver, may fail to describe adequately the mental states
that we want to compare.
172. See Scanlon, supra note 125, at 18. As he further explains:
In order for a form of interpersonal comparisons to be morally significant, what is compared
must be related to the good of the individuals in question. But a familiar moral idea of
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Once we accept this, we can reconcile ourselves to the fact that decid
ing how much weight to assign to one person's preferences compared
to another's involves making a fundamental value judgment.173
The answer to the question whether we should be making such
comparisons must be an unequivocal "yes." This is so because almost
all decisions regarding the distribution of goods (including maintaining
the status quo, for there is no value-free default to fall back upon) in
volve some interpersonal comparisons. From simple decisions be
tween two children squabbling over a choice of dessert to more com
plex ones involving tax-code revisions, we have to figure out how
much the people involved want something, and then decide how to
parse it out in a way that maximizes happiness. Thus, despite our best
attempts, we cannot make the neutral, scientific interpersonal utility
comparisons that the positivist economists thought necessary to make
value-free decisions about the distributions of goods. Instead, every
one of those decisions involves the very type of value judgment that
they sought so hard to avoid.
Ill.

IMPLICATIONS FOR VOTING RIGHTS

The problem of interpersonal utility comparisons should directly
reveal something about the nature of quantitative vote dilution and
the equiproportional standard used to measure it. Because voting is a
way to reveal preferences and counting votes is a procedure to aggre
gate those preferences, assigning numerical weights to votes necessar
ily means making some judgment as to the proper weight assigned to
each voter's preferences. And that, of course, means we have made an
interpersonal utility comparison.
This relationship between interpersonal utility comparisons and
quantitative vote dilution tells us several things about the nature of the
equiproportional standard, and I deal with each in turn. First, the rela
tionship confirms that there is nothing objective or neutral about the
standard. Second, it explains our collective attraction to the standard
Neutrality seems to demand that the interpersonal comparisons we make in ethics not be
based on our own judgments about what makes a life better for the person who lives it, all
such judgments being deferred instead to the preferences of the individuals whose lives are
being compared. The clash between these two moral ideas leads to an impasse.

Id. at 44.
173. The process of moving from normative judgment to interpersonal comparison, of
course, works both ways. As John Broome explains:
It is not as though, when we make ethical comparisons of distributions across people, the
betterness ordering of the distributions must be given in advance, so that we simply find out
from this ordering the quantitative scales of good f or individuals. To some extent we may al
ready have an idea of how one person's good compares with another's, which we can use to
form judgements about the goodness of alternative distributions, and to some extent we may
already have an idea of what distributions are better than others.

BROOME, supra note 169, at 220.
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and, somewhat paradoxically, our acceptance of certain constitutional
exceptions to it. In this vein, it also allows us to connect the concept of
quantitative vote dilution to the other two aspects of voting rights the right to exercise the franchise and the right to do so in a way free
from qualitative dilution. Third, recasting the equiproportional stan
dard in terms of making interpersonal utility comparisons gives rise to
some normative suggestions for restructuring the law governing voting
rights.
A.

Why There Is Nothing Objective About One Person, One Vote

The issues surrounding interpersonal utility comparisons make
clear that there is nothing neutral or objective about a decision to as
sign equal numerical weight to each vote.174 To be objective, a quanti
tative vote dilution standard would need to be tied in some transpar
ent way to the most relevant external object - here the relative
strengths of the preferences that an election is intended to reveal and
aggregate. The neutral way to connect the two together would be to
calibrate the weight of every person's vote with the strength of her
preference: those who care the most about the outcome of an election
receive the highest-weighted votes, those who least care about the
outcome get the lowest-weighted votes, and those somewhere in be
tween receive something in between. In such a system, the vote dilu
tion standard is that each person's vote is given a weight that matches
the strength of her preference; as more or less weight is assigned
to her vote, it concentrates or dilutes her voting power. In this
world, each individual would g�t to have her say in as many different
elections as she cared to, in exact proportion to the strength of her
preferences.175
In discussing the assignment of weights to votes based on prefer
ence strength, I am making what is mainly a descriptive point. Even
with perfect information about everyone's preferences and a method
to make comparisons between them, there may be many reasons why
we would not want to tie the weight of someone's vote to the strength
of her interest in an election. Some (members of some minority
groups, for example) may not care that much about the outcome of
elections because they have effectively been shut out of the political
system for so long. In essence, they have been trained to want and ex
pect less. Their resulting political indifference should not doom them
174. The basic point that the equiproportional standard involves some sort of normative
judgment is not new. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 32, at 4-6. But I think the more specific
point of why, exactly, it does so is new and helps fill in Rick Hasen's list of why process the
ory fails to provide an adequate foundation for the standard. See id.
175. Of course, other forms of political activity besides voting, such as running for office
or making campaign contributions, may involve more calibrated expressions of utility, but
they are beyond the scope of this Article.
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to a lightly weighed vote. Some (young children, the insane) may have
skewed ideas about what is good for them - so skewed that we make
a collective decision to override their particular preferences and do
what we think is in their best interest. That is, regardless of the
strength of their preferences, we think the content should not be re
flected in political outcomes. And awarding votes or voting weight
based on strength of preference is also a good way to reward hotheads
or those easily dissatisfied, since both groups always feel more strongly
about the outcome of an election than those with a little more toler
ance. In other words, there are many reasons why strictly tying voting
weight to preference strength may be a very bad idea.
That said, there is a great deal of evidence that we do in fact cor
relate the right to vote and the right to have one's vote accorded a cer
tain weight to the strength of one's preferences.176 When it comes to
the right to cast a ballot, controversy often revolves around which
people have sufficient interest in the outcome of an election to allow
them to vote.177 That is, both sides in a debate over the extension of
the franchise often point to the strength of a person's interest in the
election, and the corresponding strength of their preferences regarding
its outcome. This is true of many franchise restrictions, from the early
property-holding requirements to the modern-day residency require
ments.178 And it is true of some of the exceptions to the one person,
one vote requirement carved out by the Supreme Court.179 Thus, as
signing voting strength in proportion to preference strength is some
thing that is, in effect, built into many aspects of our democracy.
Although we can be pretty certain that people care about elections
to differing degrees, we lack a foolproof way of figuring out how much
they care, and, therefore, we are unable to make comparisons between
them.180 There is no objective way to devise a standard of quantitative
vote dilution that ties the weight of each person's vote to the intensity
of her preferences. Importantly, this conclusion about the lack of an
objective standard applies both to standards that assign votes different
numerical weights and to standards that assign them the same weight.
176. I tend to think we do this mainly for reasons of efficiency, not justice. That is, we do
it because we think people will make better decisions when they have something at stake in
the outcome of an election.
177. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see infra Part III.B.2.
178. See infra Part III.B.2.
179. See infra Part III.B.1-2.
180. This was the whole point of Part II.
We would, of course, have to make all sorts of other decisions regarding the allocation of
voting power in such a system. We would have to worry about the fact that such a system
would give people with a greater capacity for satisfaction more political power than the eas
ily satisfied. We would also have to worry about people strategically misrepresenting the
strength of their preferences in order to gamer more political power. But all of these consid
erations do not make the equiproportional standard any more objective.
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That is, the equiproportional standard is only objective in this sense if
people have identically strong (or weak) preferences about the out
come of an election - and we cannot know that any more than we
know the exact degree to which their preferences vary. Weighting
votes equally, then, is no more objective than weighting them une
qually and, indeed, we may very well have good reason for thinking
votes should be given different weights because people care about
elections to different degrees.
But what if, as discussed above, the relevant object is not the
strength of people's preferences but something else, like something
fundamental to the concept of democracy? Don't basic notions of
democratic fairness demand that each person's preferences, regardless
of how strongly held, be given the same amount of weight? Doesn't
the one person, one vote standard merely replicate a basic decision
about political equality that we have already made in countless other
areas?
Well, in a word, no - at least not in our democratic system.181 We
do not pretend to assign every person's preferences exactly the same
weight in any of our democratic institutions. This is true of, among
others, the U.S. Presidency, the U.S. Senate, and the federal and state
judicial systems. It is also true of institutions subject to the equipro
portional standard, such as Congress and state legislatures, for most
people are prevented from voting in most elections (because of resi
dency requirements, for example) and some are prevented from
voting in any election (because of rather ubiquitous citizenship re
quirements, for example). And, of course, arguments that such institu
tions are actually undemocratic precisely because they do not adhere
to the one person, one vote principle involve question-begging of the
worst sort.
Thus, the first thing the problem of interpersonal utility compari
sons reveals about the one person, one vote standard is that Justice
Frankfurter was right: there is nothing in our conception of democracy
that requires the standard. Instead, it is a normative choice among
many "competing bases of representation."182 Just as philosophers and
economists failed in their search for an objective, value-free way to
make interpersonal comparisons of people's preference satisfaction,
political theorists must fail in their search for a standard way of aggre
gating those preferences into a social choice. The early reapportion
ment cases did not involve the judiciary in subjective political deci
sions j ust because they inevitably entangled it in the qualitative vote
dilution cases (although that did happen). Instead, they did so quite
181. See DAHL, supra note 91 .
182. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
Charles, supra note 85, at 1126-29 (discussing the roots of Justice Frankfurter's objections to
Baker).
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directly, by deciding upon a certain correct weighting of votes without
reference to the strength of the preferences that those votes revealed.
At that point, whether they knew it or not, the Justices were already
pretty deep into the political thicket.
B.
1.

Toward a Unified Theory of Voting Rights

Why We Use the One Person, One Vote Standard

So why do we continue to apply the equiproportional standard to
some of our most important governmental institutions? The answer is,
I think, somewhat counterintuitive: we use the one person, one vote
standard in order to avoid making interpersonal comparisons of util
ity. This reason helps explain both the exceptions to the standard and
the relationship between quantitative vote dilution and access to the
ballot box.
Viewing the equiproportional standard as the result of an unwill
ingness to evaluate the strength of personal preferences is counterin
tuitive because the standard appears to embody a positive judgment of
political equality, not a negative judgment of futility or avoidance.
That is, it is a judgment that everyone has about the same level of in
terest in the outcome of an election so they should all have their pref
erences assigned equal weight. Few would argue that we all actually
have the perfectly equal interests in the outcome of an election that
would justify the slavish adherence to the standard demanded by the
Supreme Court for congressional districts. Nonetheless, there may be
a positive judgment that, in congressional or state-legislative elections,
the interests of those within the country or state are more or less the
same, and the interests of those outside the state are significantly
lower (close to zero, given that they do not have the opportunity to
vote).
But does anyone really believe that everyone within a particular
district has about the same interest in an election, or is it that we j ust
lack the kind of information needed to make a more fine-tuned as
sessment of each person's preferences? I tend to think that it is the lat
ter. If, for example, I live in Connecticut, work in New York, vacation
every summer in my second house in Vermont, and have an ailing
mother in Kansas, and you live in, work in, and never want to leave
Connecticut, it would be ridiculous to describe the strength of our re
spective interests in the elections of Connecticut, New York, Vermont,
and Kansas as (1, 0, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0, 0). But it would also be perfectly
reasonable to say that we could never come close to having the kind of
detailed information about the strength of every person's interest in
every possible election to allow us to assign and weight votes more
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precisely.183 Which is why I think use of the equiproportional standard
involves a negative judgment, a default that we apply in the many
cases in which we lack the kind of detailed information needed to tie
the weight of one's vote to the intensity of his preferences more pre
cisely.
The Supreme Court's failure to adopt a consistent notion of equal
ity in the more straightforward quantitative vote dilution cases betrays
its reluctance to make substantive judgments without more detailed
information about the strength of voter interest. As Heather Gerken
has explained, the Court's failure appears to stem from discomfort
with the structural or group-based aspects of the one person, one vote
claims. 184 A discomfort with group-based claims is a discomfort with
making what are obviously substantive political choices - choosing
winners and losers in the democratic arena. Thus, when contemplating
this facet of the quantitative dilution claims, the Court feels ill
equipped, for whatever reason, to make the substantive political deci
sions these cases demand. But, of course, the one person, one vote
standard is itself a substantive political decision, so the Court has at
best fooled itself into thinking that it has extricated the judiciary from
making political choices.
This conclusion is also confirmed by and helps explain some of the
exceptions to the one person, one vote standard, and, more broadly,
accounts for the link between quantitative vote dilution and access to
the ballot box. When we do have (or think we have) more detailed in
formation about the strength of voter preferences, we allow excep
tions to the one person, one vote standard. (Indeed, as discussed be
low, we even allow states to withhold the franchise completely.) In
such situations, states will often establish a method of weighting votes
that corresponds to some proxy for strength of voter interest.185
The exemption given to special-purpose districts is a good example
of this principle. The one person, one vote standard applies to only
those local governmental units186 that exercise "general governmental
powers," including carrying out the common functions of a municipal

183. Along these lines, Gerald Frug has suggested a plan where everyone receives five
votes that they may cast in whatever local elections they feel affect their interests. See
GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNmES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
106-07 ( 1999). Allowing voters to define their own interests would surmount some of the
hurdles in coming up with detailed information on voter preferences.
184. See Gerken, supra note 88, at 1457-66.
185 . Of course, the dominant rule in corporate governance is the one share, one vote
principle, which allows shareholders to cast votes weighted in proportion to their financial
stake in the corporation. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model
of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945 ( 1996).
186. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying the equipropor
tional standard to a junior college district) ; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 ( 1968)
(applying the equiproportional standard to a county) .
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government.187 We would expect such a governmental body to affect
all within its power to more or less the same degree, and would there
fore expect people to have more or less the same strength of prefer
ences as to the representatives on that body. It would make sense,
then, to apply the equiproportional standard in these districts (if any
where). In A very v. Midland County , however, the Supreme Court re
served the issue of whether the equiproportional standard applied to
local governmental units that did not affect all within their power to
the same degree, stating:
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government as
signed the performance of functions affecting definable groups of con
stituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront
the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which
give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization's
functions.1 88

The Court would soon confront the status of these "special-purpose
districts" in a case involving California's Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District.189
The Tulare Lake water district covered 193,000 acres of farmland
inhabited by seventy-seven people, most of whom were employees of
one of four large corporations that farmed land in the district.190 The
district was in charge of the acquisition, storage, conservation, and dis
tribution of water.191 To that end, it had the power to acquire and im
prove property, generate and distribute hydroelectric power, charge
for water, and assess costs associated with these activities in accor
dance with the benefits accruing to each tract of land.192 An elected
187. See, e.g., Hadley, 397 U.S. at 54; Avery, 390 U.S. at 484-85; see also New York City
Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 694-96 (1989). Morris provides a good example of a
governmental entity that exercises general governmental powers:
New York law assigns to the board a significant range of functions common to municipal
governments. Fiscal responsibilities include calculating sewer and water rates, tax abate
ments, and property taxes on urban development projects. The board manages all city prop
erty; exercises plenary zoning authority; dispenses all franchises and leases on city property;
fixes generally the salaries of all officers and persons compensated through city moneys; and
grants all city contracts. . . .
In addition, and of inajor significance, the board shares legislative functions with the city
council with respect to modifying and approving the city's capital and expense budgets. The
mayor submits a proposed city budget to the board and city council, but does not participate
in board decisions to adopt or alter the proposal. Approval or modification of the proposed
budget requires agreement between the board and the city council.

Id.
188. Avery, 390 U.S. at 483-84.
189. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
Nearly a decade later, the Court confronted another water district and reached a similar re
sult. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
190. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 723.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 723-24.
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board of directors governed the water district. The elections, however,
were limited in that only landowners could vote, and their votes were
apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the land they
owned (sort of a one acre, one vote system).193 As a result, one corpo
rate landowner had 37,825 votes, while other, smaller landowners had
only one vote.194 The latter brought suit alleging that the voting
scheme violated the one person, one vote requirement of the Equal
Protection Clause.195
The Supreme Court disagreed. In doing so, the Court carved out
the "special-purpose district" exception to the one person, one vote
requirement,196 and further found that the proportionate voting
scheme used in its place had a rational basis.197 This was so, the Court
reasoned, because the board's powers were limited such that its ac
tions disproportionately affected landowners (as opposed to mere
residents),198 and that benefits and burdens fell on landowners in pro
portion to the amount of land they owned.199 Landowners have a
greater interest in, and care more about, the storage and distribution
of water in the Tulare Lake water district, and the strength of their in
terest roughly corresponds to the amount of land that they own.
This case, therefore, is an example of one in which we think we
have some information about the relative strength of people's prefer
ences, and can make the kind of interpersonal utility comparisons that
allow us to deviate from the one person, one vote principle.200 Even
Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, did not really disagree with the
fundamental notion that there may be times when an exception of this

193. Id. at 724-25.
194. Id. at 733.
195. See id. at 724-27. The plaintiffs also contended that the scheme, by requiring voters
. to own land, resulted in a denial of their equal protection rights. Id. at 730.
196. Id. at 730.
197. Id. at 734.
198. Id. at 729.
199. Id. at 734.
200. This reasoning has been applied in many cases where the actions of a local govern
mental entity disproportionately affect people. See, e.g., Porterfield v. Van Boening, 744 P.2d
468 (Ariz. 1987) (irrigation district); Arizona Farmworkers Union v. Agric. Employment
Relations Bd., 712 P.2d 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (union-representation district); Schindler
v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (irrigation district);
Thompson v. Bd. of Directors, 55 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (irrigation district);
Chesser v. Buchanan, 568 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1977) (tunnel-improvement district); Stelzel v. S.
Indian River Water Control Dist., 486 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1986) (water-control district); State v.
Frontier Acres Cmty. Dev. Dist., 472 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1985) (community-development dis
trict); Lake Howell Water & Reclamation Dist. v. State, 268 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1972) (drainage
district); Goldstein v. Mitchell, 494 N.E.2d 914 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (drainage district).
Sanford Levinson muses about a few other possibilities in this regard, such as giving law
yers an extra vote in judicial elections because of their special knowledge of and interest in
such elections. See Levinson, supra note 88, at 1276-77.
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kind is appropriate;201 instead, he just believed that this was not one of
those times. In his opinion, the board took actions that affected all
within the district (such as managing flood control), and so everyone
had an interest in the elections.202 But all members of the Court shared
the notion that the strength of one's interest in an election bears some
relationship to the weight assigned to one's vote.
The special-purpose-district cases show us two things. First, they
show that the Court is willing to allow states to parse out votes in rela
tionship to the strength of a voter's interest in the outcome of the elec
tion. This tells us that in some fairly extreme cases, when we think we
have enough information about voter preferences to make interper
sonal comparisons of utility, we allow certain tailored exceptions to
the one person, one vote standard. Second, the special-purpose-district
cases show that the Court will allow a state to - right off the top restrict voting eligibility to one particular class of people (in this case,
landowners).203 This is something that may be quite obvious, but brings
us to the second point of this Part: that in addition to explaining some
of the exceptions to the equiproportional standard, the problem of in
terpersonal utility comparisons.helps explain the reasoning behind re
stricting the franchise outright, and thus the relationship between the
right to cast a ballot and the right to cast an equally weighted ballot.
2.

Quantitative Vote Dilution and Access

That the right to cast a ballot and the right to cast an equally
weighted ballot are somehow connected should not be surprising. The
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, in oft-quoted language, noted that
"the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting
the free exercise of the franchise. "204 Practically speaking, numerically
diluting a vote can, in extreme cases, have the same effect as denying
the right to vote altogether, and thus our · voting rights laws protect
against both. But interpersonal utility comparisons tell us that the two
types of voting rights are not only related because of a similar effect;
they are also, to some extent, produced by the same cause.
The special-purpose-district cases show that we allow states to vary
the numerical power of one's vote when we think we have good in
formation about the varying degrees of interest that people have in the
201. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 736-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
203. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 726-30.
204. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Dis
tributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REV. 549, 550 (1985) (describing both
the relative weight given to votes and the exclusion of some persons from the franchise as
"distributional" issues).
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outcome of the election. At some point, however, we make a j udg
ment that certain people have so little interest in an election that they
should not vote at all. While there is always disagreement about which
people have an interest sufficient to allow them to vote, the two sides
of any such debate seem to acknowledge the underlying principle that
we can make the decision based, at least in part, on the strength of the
person's interest in the election, and the corresponding strength of
their preferences about its outcome.205 Historical and contemporary
examples help illustrate this point.
At this country's founding, many states limited suffrage to white
men who owned a certain amount of property.206 One of the principal
justifications for these freehold requirements was the idea that those
who possessed real property "had a unique 'stake in society' meaning that they were committed members of (or shareholders in)
the community and that they had a personal interest in the policies of
the state, especially taxation."207 In the early nineteenth century, when
states replaced property requirements with taxpaying requirements,
they, too, were justified by arguments that only those with a stake in
the community should be able to vote,208 and that only those who
share the burdens of government should have a voice in it.209 (In other
words, "no representation without taxation.") Both of these early eco
nomic restraints on the franchise, then, were justified by the argument
that the right to vote should only be extended to those most affected
by and interested in the business of government.
One contemporary set of restraints on the exercise of the franchise
- so widespread that they are rarely analyzed as such - are residency
requirements.210 These, too, are justified by the assumption that only
those who live within the territory under the control of a governmen·

205. See Melvyn R Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt· Reappraising the Right to Vote in
Terms of Political "Interest " and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1982)
(discussing the fact that " 'interest,' implicitly or explicitly, must be the touchstone of the
Court's analysis" of several types of voting rights cases).
206. For a list of the property and taxpaying requirements in the colonies and states be
tween 1776 and 1855, see KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at app. tbls.1-3.
207. Id. at 5; see also Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, OneVote: Better Results from the Voting Rights Act?, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1153 (1996).
208. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 131.
209. See id. at 50.
210. Mere residency requirements, sometimes called bona fide residency requirements,
are not to be confused with durational residency requirements. Durational residency re
quirements, which require an extended period of residency before one becomes eligible to
vote, were often instituted to diminish the political power of certain, more itinerant groups.
See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 146-51 . The Court later declared such requirements unconsti
tutional unless "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest," Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) (emphasis and citations omitted), although it did allow
states to require voters to register thirty days in advance of an election, id. at 347.
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tal body have enough of a stake in the government to vote.211 Indeed,
residency requirements, like the equiproportional standard, some
times find justification in the fact that they are easily managed.212 In
other words, it is too difficult to figure out which nonresidents have a
sufficient stake in an election, so we use a residency default as a proxy
for such an interest.213 While academics and litigants have challenged
such requirements, they usually leave the assumption untouched.
Again, the quibble is that residency, or lack of it, does not serve as a
very accurate proxy for the strength of one's preferences in the out
come of an election.214 Those who live in one city or state and work in
another argue that they have enough at stake in their workplace that
they should be allowed to vote in its jurisdiction, and those who own
vacation homes argue that they too are sufficiently interested in the
jurisdictions where their homes are located. All seem to agree that the
key to the right to vote is having a sufficient interest in the outcome of
the election. And, just as it is with the exceptions to the equipropor
tional standard, the common root of such arguments is that we
can make the kind of interpersonal utility comparisons that would al
low us to make informed judgments about different people's levels of
interest, and thus their rights to vote or their rights to an equally
weighted vote.
The Supreme Court was most explicit about the constitutional
status of interest-based exclusions from the franchise in Kramer v.

211. See Smith, supra note 207, at 1159 (explaining that, in the 1960s, residency became
"the sole proxy for electoral interest. Residency - and, in most cases, residency alone became the standard for granting suffrage to qualified potential voters."). This is not to im
ply that such a justification is the only justification for residency requirements. They were
also imposed in order to limit the voting power of recent immigrants, KEYSSAR, supra note
8, at 147-51, and to prevent fraud by those who would temporarily move a large group of
people into a jurisdiction in order to win an election, id. at 148.
212. See, e.g., Kollar v. City of Tucson, 319 F. Supp. 482 (D. Ariz. 1970) (finding an
Arizona law limiting voting in municipal water-bond elections to municipal residents to be
constitutional despite the fact that nonresidents may have had a pecuniary interest in the
elections).
213. See id. at 485 ("To allow the municipal franchise to [extend to] all persons with a
pecuniary interest would not permit of a manageable standard or adequately define a cohe
sive interest group of electors.").
214. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) ("The imaginary
line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions. A
city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders.");
Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1 115, 1 132 (1996) ("Boundaries exclude people who may be interested in or
affected by the decisions made within the boundaries.").
For this reason and others, some scholars have suggested decoupling voting from resi
dency. See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard
Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1 187-89 (1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries
of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909 (1994); Jerry
Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 324-25 (1993). For a critique, see
Briffault, supra, at 1158-62.
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Union Free School District.215 Kramer involved a challenge to a voter
qualification statute for school-district elections that limited the fran
chise to people who either (a) owned or leased taxable real property
within the district, or (b) had children enrolled in the district's
schools.216 While the Court rendered the statute unconstitutional be
cause the restrictions were not narrowly tailored (they included some
uninterested people and excluded some interested ones ),217 the Court
assumed that a state may limit the franchise to the portion of the elec
torate 'primarily affected' by the outcome of an election if it demon
strates that "all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested
or affected than those the [franchise] includes."218 Thus, the Court did
not question the assumption that people might be classified into two
groups - voters and nonvoters - based upon the level of their inter
est in the election.219 And, as discussed above, the Court allowed just
such a classification in the case of special-purpose districts.
Of course, governmental restrictions on the franchise are not the
only way to calibrate voter participation with voter interest. Eligible
voters may (and undoubtedly often do) decide on their own that a par
ticular election does not merit the time or energy required to actually

215. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
216. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622.
217. See id. at 632. As an example, the Court explained:
[A]ppellant resides with his parents in the school district, pays state and federal taxes and is
jnterested in and affected by school board decisions; however, he has no vote. On the other
hand, an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no state or federal truces, but who
rents an apartment in the district, can participate in the election.
Id. at 632 n.15.

218. See id. at 632. Rick Hasen, among others, argues that the Court used a "judicial
sleight-of-hand" in moving from the state's argument with respect to a voter's objective in
terest in an election to the plaintiff's subjective interests in an election in deciding that the
law was not narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional scrutiny. See HASEN, supra note
32, at 63-64; see also Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Lo
cal Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 354-56 (1993). While this may be true, I do not
think the distinction between objective and subjective interests ultimately has any bearing on
this issue here. If anything, it supports the argument that the Court, despite its concern with
the level of voter interest, finds making such individualized assessments to be practically im
possible.
219. In a similar vein, with respect to the poll tax successfully challenged in Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), John Hart Ely explained that, despite the fact
that the Court found the tax to be irrational, "[i)t may also be true, or at least it is not irra
tional to think so, that persons of some wealth tend to be more 'responsible' citizens or,
more plausibly still, that willingness to pay a fee for voting is some reflection of serious in
terest in the election." ELY, supra note 50, at 120. Other contemporary restrictions on the
franchise, such as citizenship requirements, have also been subject to this type of interest
analysis. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitu
tional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1441-45 (1993)
(listing the "classical democratic" arguments for alien suffrage).
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vote.220 Without delving into the voluminous literature on voter turn
out,221 it suffices for these purposes to say that at least one of the rea
sons people do not vote is that they do not care enough about the out
come of the election. But like governmental restrictions on the right to
vote, individual decisions to vote only crudely reflect preference
strength - people's interest in the election either reaches a particular
threshold point at which they vote, or it does not. There is no way to
weight a vote in a way that might reflect preference strength in a more
nuanced way. But, like outright denials of the franchise, the issue of
voter turnout may be amenable to this kind of analysis.
·

3.

Quantitative and Qualitative Vote Dilution

Analyzing the equiproportional standard as an exercise in making
interpersonal utility comparisons may also tell us that quantitative and
qualitative vote dilution are, at some core level, the same thing.222 This
is true for a couple of reasons.
First, because it is impossible to make objective interpersonal
comparisons, quantitative vote dilution standards - whether equipro
portional or, in a more obvious case, interest-based standards some
times used in special-purpose districts - stand on judgments every bit
as subjective as those used in qualitative vote dilution decisions.223 This
both confirms and strengthens the argument for what some commen
tators have been saying for a long time: that the right to a numerically
undiluted vote, like the right to a qualitatively undiluted vote, is best
viewed as a group right.224 In both cases, we must make a normative
220. Voluntary decisions not to vote seem different than mandatory restrictions on the
franchise, but, either way, if the person does not vote, her preferences are not reflected in
the social choice, and there is a relationship between interest and the lack of a vote.
221. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVENS & RICHARD CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS
DON'T VOTE (1989) (discussing various theories for low voter turnout).
222. Barbara Phillips makes a similar point, but the basis for her claim is, I think, some
what thinner. She notes:
Ultimately, it becomes apparent that all vote dilution claims allege injury of essentially the
same character. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Court to apply differing standards to
dilution claims depending upon the descriptive nature of the challenged aggregation prac
tice. That the aggregation's deficiency can be attributed to a group characteristic of location,
race, language, or political affiliation should be irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry.
Phillips, supra note 118, at 583. But it appears that the only common point for her is that all
types of dilution claims affect the ability to aggregate votes. That, I think, is true (and is also
true of the access cases - since if you cannot vote, you cannot aggregate your vote with
those of other like-minded people), but incomplete - for if this is the only connection, it is
still quite possible that different sorts of dilution affect a group's ability to aggregate votes in
different ways, and thus may require different standards and solutions.
223. See supra Part III.A
224. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 2, at 124-25; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2282 n.30
(1998); Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 114, at 1717-18.
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j udgment about which groups of people we will allow to aggregate
votes to elect someone to represent their interests. The seductive ap
peal of the one person, one vote standard has led us to believe that it
is somehow based on an individual right and is therefore more neutral
or objective. It is not.
Second, and more importantly, the two types of vote dilution may
also be related because membership in a particular group, in addition
to telling us something about the content of an individual's prefer
ences, tells us something about the strength of those preferences. On a
general level, we may describe membership in a political community in
terms of shared interest in the outcome of an election. That is, the fact
that a particular group of people will experience the impact of a given
election more acutely than others helps to define the group.225 All of
those living in an agricultural valley may have a particular interest in
water-distribution issues. They may disagree among themselves, but
they all have relatively strong interests at stake in - and therefore
intense preferences about - a water-board election. Those living in
the South may have a strong interest in civil-rights issues. Again,
whites and blacks in the South may generally be on opposite sides of
such issues, but they all feel strongly about them.
Moreover, within these groups, there are subgroups {farmers or
homeowners, whites or blacks) that not only have strong interests in
an election, but also share an opinion as to the preferred outcome.226
Members of such groups are likely to have particularly strong prefer
ences, both because people with strong preferences are initially more
likely to identify as part of a group that shares their political objectives
and because membership subsequently reinforces the nature and
strength of those preferences. {This may also wash out the typical dis
tinction drawn between individual and group rights. People are placed
in groups for the purposes of voting based in part on real or perceived
individual interest, and that membership in the group, in turn, forms
and informs individual interest.)
The fact that certain groups share preferences with similar content
and of similar strength provides this second connection between quali
tative and quantitative vote dilution. Qualitative vote dilution, as dis
cussed above, occurs when people are unable to combine their votes
with those of other like-minded people in a way that allows them to
have a chance of electing a candidate of their choice.227 The presence
of a group of like-minded people, then, is a necessary prerequisite to
any claim of qualitative dilution. It is for this reason that one must
prove membership in a group that is "politically cohesive" in order to
225. See Calhoun, supra note 204, at 579-80.
226. Id. at 579-80 & n.150.
227. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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bring a claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.228 But because
membership in a politically cohesive group may tell us something
about the strength of a person's preferences, we may use it to calibrate
the numerical weight of that person's (or group's) vote as well. The
fact that a group has a potential qualitative vote dilution claim may
tell us that it is also a group whose votes should receive more weight.229
The remedy, then, may be both to redraw district lines to provide
more majority-minority districts and to reduce the size of those dis
tricts to concentrate the vote numerically.230 And all of this comes
about because the relationship between group membership and pref
erence strength provides the link between the concepts of qualitative
and quantitative vote dilution
4.

Some Implications for Voting Rights Law

The insights gleaned from viewing voting rights as a function of in
terpersonal utility comparisons may help reframe some of the theo
retical problems associated with voting rights. It makes clear that a
districting decision based on the one person, one vote standard is no
less subjective than a decision about who gets to vote and about how,
exactly, district lines are drawn. It also ties the three types of voting
rights together at some fundamental level. The ultimate issue, though,
will be what all of this means for the legal status of the various types
of voting rights. And though the full implications are beyond the scope
of this Article, I do wish to offer some preliminary thoughts on the
subject.231
The first and most obvious implication is that, to the extent that
the quantitative vote dilution cases receive special legal treatment as a
result of the fact that the one person, one vote standard is a more
"objective" basis for judicial decisionmaking, we need to either j ustify
that treatment on some other basis or eliminate it. Quantitative vote
228. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). This is discussed in greater
detail infra Part IIl.B.4.
229. This argument, one might suppose, could also militate in favor of numerically con
centrating the voting power of white voters in a typical qualitative vote dilution case, be
cause such cases require the presence of both minority and majority racial bloc voting. See
id. But there are at least two preliminary answers to this possible implication. First, there is
usually a much higher degree of bloc voting among minority groups than among majority
groups in the typical vote dilution case (in other words, there are usually more white cross
over voters than black or Hispanic crossover voters). Second, nothing in my argument pre
vents one from making a further normative decision to numerically concentrate the votes of
one group over another group with equally strong preferences. Indeed, the argument is that
all of these decisions involve substantive political choices.
230. This is discussed more fully infra Part IIl.B.4.
231. For more extended thoughts on the subject, see Grant M. Hayden, Beyond One
Person, One Vote: Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2004).

262

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:213

dilution claims involving state legislative districts are typically brought
under the Equal Protection Clause, but, unlike other such claims, they
do not require proof of discriminatory intent.232 That, coupled with the
Court's low tolerance for population deviation, means that the mo
ment the census figures are released, almost every existing districting
plan is unconstitutional.233 This, in tum, licenses "a race to the court
house" by plaintiffs who, while perhaps not overly concerned with the
numerical disparities, see them as an opportunity to present remedial
plans that favor their particular interest.234
These doctrinal and temporal privileges afforded to the one per
son, one vote claims appear to find roots in the objective nature of the
standard; districts with different populations are so obviously wrong
that they need to be remedied without regard to intent or any other
evidence that they substantively affect a particular group's vote. While
I do not think the Court should require proof of discriminatory intent
(or, at least, what the Court considers adequate proof of such intent)
in any equal protection claims, the point here is that, either way, it
should not treat the one person, one vote cases more leniently. An in
tent requirement, coupled with a relaxation of the Court's strict nu
merical rules regarding apportionment bases, would go a long way in
this direction.
A second set of suggestions for legal reform comes from the rela
tionship between quantitative vote dilution and access to the polls.
Currently, one either has the right to vote or not, and one is either
counted in the apportionment base or not. But if both access to the
polls and quantitative voting power are a function of preference
strength, we should, in some cases, be able to do better. That is, if pos
sible - because we have sufficiently detailed preference information
- and when appropriate, we should be able to tailor voting power to
certain groups.
One example of this involves resident aliens.235 Resident aliens
have vital political, economic, and social interests in the towns, states,
and country in which they live.236 They thus have much at stake in
most elections, and we would reasonably expect them to have prefer232. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1414-15 (7th
Cir. 1992). Claims involving congressional districts are brought under Article I, section 2 of
the Constitution, and also do not require a showing of discriminatory intent.
233. See Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 114, at 1726.
234. Id. at 1726-29.
235. Other, less controversial examples may include assigning partial voting power to
students or other people who might qualify as residents in more than one place. See Ashira
Pelman Ostrow, Dual Resident Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement and Prospects for
Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954 (2002) (arguing that dual residents should be enfran
chised at the local level).
236. For a good discussion of these interests, and judicial commentary on them, see
Raskin, supra note 219, at 1441-45.
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ences about the outcomes that are no less (or little less) strong than
those of citizens. But even if they have a bit less of an interest in the
outcome of elections than their citizen neighbors, it still seems to be
sufficiently hefty to merit some voting power. Despite this fact (and
periods of our history to the contrary),237 resident aliens now lack the
right to vote in most every jurisdiction in the country.238 (They are,
however, included in the population base for reapportionment pur
poses, which gives their citizen neighbors a little extra voting power.)
One solution, of course, would be to abolish citizenship require
ments and extend the right to vote to resident aliens.239 But we should
also be able to tailor voting power to the level of the group's interest.
If we decided that resident aliens systematically lack the full-blown
stake in society that their citizen counterparts possess, we could grant
them the vote but limit its effect on the outcome of any election. And
while it would probably not be possible to modulate voting power by
placing resident aliens in larger districts (without diluting their citizen
neighbors' votes), we could easily do so under other voting schemes
that give voters multiple votes, such as a cumulative voting system in
which each voter has several votes to distribute among candidates,240
or Gerald Frug's proposal to give each voter five votes to cast in the
local election of her choice.241 If citizen voters were given five votes,
resident aliens could be given, say, three votes.
Though it may be symbolically or psychologically damaging to pos
sess only three-fifths of a full citizen's vote (and conjure up memories
of the original Census Clause in the Constitution,242 which counted

2 37. Alien suffrage was quite common during the nineteenth century, coming to a peak
in 1875 when twenty-two states and territories granted aliens the right to vote. See KEYSSAR,
supra note 8, at 32-33, 104-05; Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History,
the Law and Current Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQUALITY 271, 273-83 (2000) . Anti
foreigner sentiment, heightened by waves of immigration and World War I, led to the de
mise of alien suffrage in the first part of the twentieth century. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at
136-39; Harper Ho, supra at 282-83. Although some local jurisdictions, such as Takoma Park,
Maryland, have recently extended the right to vote to aliens, a more widespread movement
on this front seems unlikely. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 310-11; Harper-Ho, supra at 28385.
238. See Raskin, supra note 2 19, at 1460-61.
2 39. See id. (arguing that alien suffrage makes sense for a variety of reasons); Gerald M.
Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092,
1093-94 ( 1977) (arguing that alien suffrage is constitutionally required).
240. In a cumulative voting scheme, each person is allotted as many votes as there are
open seats. Voters may distribute their votes as they see fit, either aggregating their votes for
one strongly preferred alternative or dispersing their votes among several alternatives. See
Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Dis
tricts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1 156 ( 1993) (arguing that cumulative voting and other
"semiproportional election systems may provide a more politically fair route to participation
and political representation for racially distinct groups").
241. See FRUG, supra note 183, at 106-07.
242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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slaves as three-fifths of a person for apportionment purposes), it may
be better than nothing (the current status). But the real points here
are that voting power does not have to be an all-or-nothing proposi
tion, and that there may be times and places when legislatures should
have the power, within constraints, to tailor access to the polls (here,
in terms of the number of votes) and district size to accommodate the
unique status of some groups. And while the case of resident aliens
probably presents a fairly contentious example, a less controversial
proposal might involve giving part-time residents or college students
partial voting power in each of their local communities.
A third round of suggested changes comes out of the relationship
between quantitative and qualitative vote dilution. Because of their
close relationship, and the essentially normative character of each, we
should be able to think about them as more or less interchangeable. If,
for example, a particular group's vote is qualitatively diluted, we could
quantitatively concentrate it in order to shore up its power at the polls.
To be more concrete, imagine a typical claim of qualitative vote
dilution brought by a group of black voters against a congressional dis
tricting plan under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.243 In order to
succeed, the plaintiffs would need to show, in the words of the Act,
that the plan gives them "less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect represen
tatives of their choice."244 This they could do by proving the factors
laid out in Thornburgh v. Gingles,245 the Supreme Court's first inter
pretation of the 1982 amendments or, more recently, by reference to a
totality of the circumstances.246
243.

See 42 U.S.C. §§

244. 42 u.s.c.

1971-1973bb-1

(2000).

§ 1973(b).

245. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). The three-part test for vote dilution requires the plaintiff
to demonstrate that (1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district, (2) the minority group is politically cohe
sive, and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to defeat the minority's pre
ferred candidate usually.
246.

See id.

See

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (requiring courts to go beyond
Gingles's three-pronged test and analyze the totality of the circumstances). The Johnson
Court, quoting Gingles, summarized the factors laid out in the Senate Report that accompa
nied the 1982 a mendments to the Voting Rights Act:
The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a § 2 claim: the his
tory of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent to which
voting.in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to
which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting;
the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent
to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as
education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the
extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that elected officials are un
responsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and that the
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Once the plaintiffs succeeded in proving dilution, the proposed
remedy would most likely be a redrawn districting plan in which
members of the minority group constitute a voting majority in one or
more of the districts. Importantly, all of this currently takes place
within the strictures of the constitutional one person, one vote re
quirement. That is, the original and redrawn districts need to have the
same number of people in them (or, in the case of state and local dis
tricts, close to the same number of people). The lines are changed, but
the population of each district remains the same.
But if the two types of dilution are related, we should be able to
manipulate both the shape and the size of the district in order to shore
up minority political participation.247 That is, in addition to redrawing
district lines in a way that creates majority-minority districts, we could
allow plaintiffs to propose (and courts to approve) remedial plans that
reduce the numerical size of those districts to further concentrate
black voting power. This would give voting-rights plaintiffs additional
tools to use in their quest for more effective participation.
These suggestions are not meant to be exhaustive, nor are they
meant to suggest that judicial micromanagement of voting power
based on an analysis of group preferences is necessarily a good idea.
Instead, the point is that despite appearances (and law) to the con
trary, the three principal varieties of voting rights - involving access
to the ballot box, quantitative dilution, and qualitative dilution - all
necessarily entail normative judgments of a related character. So when
we think about one aspect of voting rights, we should be thinking
about all of them. When state legislatures make redistricting decisions,
they should be able to manipulate district size in order, say, to meet
the strictures of the Voting Rights Act. And once we decide that
courts should intervene in democratic politics, we should equip them
with a full arsenal of possible remedies.
Indeed, it may well be that removing the aura of objectivity from
the one person, one vote claims would result in less j udicial involve
ment in democratic politics. If the legal bar for such claims were
raised, it would prevent groups from piggybacking their real claims on
the backs of violations of the one person, one vote standard. And the
judiciary might be less inclined to intervene in disputes that visibly re
quire them to make substantive political decisions. Rick Hasen re
cently wrote that Reynolds v. Sims begets Bush v. Gore.248 If he is right

policy underlying the State's or the political subdivisions's use of the contested practice or
structure is tenuous may have probative value.

Johnson,

512 U.S. at 1010-11 n.9 (quoting
omitted)).

Gingles,

478 U.S. at 44-45 (internal citations

247. For a variation of this idea, see Hayden, supra note 231.
248. Richard L. Hasen,
Bush v. Gore, 80 TEXAS

A "Tincture of Justice": Judge Posner's Failed Rehabilitation of
L. REV. 137, 154 (2001) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER,
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(and I think that he is), bringing the one person, one vote standard
back down to the messy world of democratic politics where it belongs
may not be such a bad thing.
CONCLUSION

The three types of voting rights, developed over three generations
of minority-voting-rights litigation, have resulted in tremendous ad
vances in political participation. But the second type of right - that
involving quantitative vote dilution and the one person, one vote stan
dard - is based in part on a false promise of neutrality and objectiv
ity. That false promise now has come back to haunt us: it divorces
voting rights law from the reality of preference aggregation and pre
vents us from developing a more complete theory of voting rights.
A more complete theory of voting rights may, preliminarily, tell us
a couple of things. It may tell us, for example, that the law should not
be structured in a way that treats the three types of voting rights
claims - access to the ballot box, quantitative dilution, and qualitative
vote dilution - within three entirely different doctrinal frameworks.
Under current law, the sources of the rights are different (some are
constitutionalized, some not), the substantive requirements of the
claims are different (some require intent, some do not), and the pro
cedural prerequisites are different (some have reduced requirements
for standing, for example). The fact that each of the rights, though, are
at some level interchangeable, coupled with the essentially normative
character of all three, means that such a disjointed approach is not
true to the underlying nature of the claims.
The fact that the three types of voting rights are inextricably linked
together means that legislatures and courts should have more leeway
in analyzing them and in fashioning remedies. Thus, when pursuing
certain social goals, such as providing meaningful political participa
tion to historically disadvantaged minority groups, we should allow
Congress, state legislatures, and courts to tinker with all three aspects
of voting rights. Minority plaintiffs in section 2 Voting Rights Act
cases and the Justice Department in section 5 preclearance cases
should be able to propose districts that not only serve to concentrate
the minority vote qualitatively, but quantitatively as well. Keeping
such issues and claims strictly compartmentalized makes little sense
from either a theoretical or practical standpoint.
Thus, analyzing the one person, one vote standard from the per
spective of interpersonal utility comparisons frees us of the false
promise, and resulting constraints, of the seemingly objective nature of
the standard. It shows the essentially normative character of all deciBREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS
(2001)).
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sions to grant, deny, or dilute the right to vote. And it may provide us
with a more unified theory of voting rights.

